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THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Emphasis on the attribution of causality in social 
psychology was. initiated by Heider (1958), who delineated 
conditions under which causality for actions and .outcomes 
may be assigned to individuals. In the mid-1960's extensions 
of Heider's work appeared, as Jones and Davis (1965) specl-
fied conditions under which attributions of personal dispo-
sition can follow from inferences of intentions, and Kelley 
(1967) studied occassions when external entities (objects) 
are assigned responsibility or causality for actions and 
outcomes. 
The theories of Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley 
(1967) brought about a rapid expansion of attribution liter-
ature, causlng a loss of central structure and theorization. 
A survey of current journals reveals that present experi-
ments have studied specific attribution situations and data, 
and have ignored the more integrative attribution theories. 
For example, Shaver (1970) considered attributions made by 
observers (individuals who observe actions and outcomes of 
others) who share personal or situational similarity to 
actors (individuals whose actions produce outcomes); Miller 
and Norman· (in press) investigated differences between 
1 
active and passlve observing; and Jones and Nisbett (1972) 
hypothesized a divergence between actor and observer attri-
butions. 
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An additional development has been the emergence of 
research on attributions of responsibility, rather than 
causality. Causality implies the question, "Did I/you pro-
duce the outcome?" Responsibility implies a narrower ques-
tion, "Am I/you personally accountable for the outcome which 
I/you produced?" Empirically the difference is presented in 
Heider's (1958) levels of commission, which reflect dif-
ferent degrees of relationship and accountability between 
actors and outcomeso These levels of commission show that 
under certain conditions individuals are assigned low per-
sonal responsibility for actions producing outcomes 
(causality). 
The literature on responsibility attributions alone is 
vast. Yet, little attempt has been made to integrate this 
information into a coherent model. The present experiment 
is part of a research program designed to develop a system 
that achieves that integration. The goal of this program 
is to present a model which accurately predicts the respon-
sibility attributions of actors for both good and bad 
personal outcomes, and of observers who might hold any 
relationship (e.g., friends, strangers, or enemies) to 
actors. Briefly, the basic proposition of this integration 
is that the favorable or unfavorable relevance of an event 
to an attributor's (either an "actor" or an "observer") self 
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system determines his attribution of responsibility for that 
event. Favorable outcomes of personal relevance are attri-
buted to personal responsibility; unfavorable outcomes of 
personal relevance are attributed to impersonal (environ-
mental) responsibility. 
The first experiment in this program (Finney, Merri-
field, & Helm, in press) presented subjects with a descrip-
tion of a character and an incident in which he was involved. 
Subjects were asked to attribute responsibility for the 
incident from their own~ and from their idea of the actor's, 
viewpoints. This study established that written scenarios 
can provide sufficient information for subjects to specify 
that actors and observers would attribute responsibility 
differently for a negative, harmful outcome. Finney, Merri-
field, and Helm also found evidence which can be interpreted 
as implying that observers who share a role similarity with 
the actor make responsibility attributions more as the actor 
would than as unbiased observers. 
The next experiment (Finney, Helm, & Fromme, Note 1) 
also used a scenario, role-playing method to demonstrate 
that subjects perceive that actors will accept as much 
responsibility for a good outcome as unbiased observers 
would assign to them. This experiment also verified that 
subjects perceive actors as accepting less responsibility 
for a bad outcome than observers would assign to them~ 
These studies did not directly assess the relevance of 
attributions to self systems, but their results can be 
explained by considering self system motivation, and can be 
interpreted as indirect support of the contention that self 
system motivation plays a role in attributions. 
Since Finney, Merrifield, and Helm (in press) and 
Finney, Helm, and Fromme (Note 1) involved attributions 
regarding outcomes of scenario characters and did not test 
self system motivations in subjects, the purpose of the 
present experiment was to provide a more direct laboratory 
test of the significance of the self system in actor and 
observer attributions. Consistent with self system consi-
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derations, predictions will be made concerning both the 
effect of success (winning) and of failure (losing) on 
actors' and observers' responsibility attributions. The 
study also tested how stranger or friendship relations alter 
the level of self system arousal in both actors and obser-
vers and, therefore, affects responsibility attributions. 
At this point it should be mentioned that current 
literature suggests that the self system is not relevant to 
attributions. Miller and Ross (1975) present a review of 
these contentions, emphasizing information-processing 
rather than ego considerations to account for biases in 
attributions. They concede, however, that the evidence for 
completely ruling out self system motives is presently 
ambiguous. Indeed, Kiesler (Note 2) has argued that the 
failing of attribution theory is that its current 
information-processing approach does not incorporate goal-
seeking motivations into the model. 
Thus, the following literature review has two main 
purposes. At the same time that a theory regarding the 
influence of the self system on responsibility attributions 
is developed, it must be shown that the information-
' processing approach alone does not adequately predict 
responsibility attributi9ns. These arguments will be pre-
sented in the following sequence. First, self systems will 
be discussed in terms of the components of the self, the 
effects of outcom~s on the self, and the relationship 
between expressed emotions and the self. Then, evidence 
will be presented which shows that the self system approach 
is a better predictor of an actop's responsibility attri-
butions than is the information-processing approach, and 
that the type of audience observing an actor (friendly or 
stranger) affects the degree to which outcomes are relevant 
to the actor's self system, thereby additionally affecting 
his responsibility attributions. An argument will next be 
presented establishing that the same self system factor 
which influences an actor's attributions also influences 
the observer's attributions. Finally, hypotheses for the 
current experiment will be derived. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE SELF SYSTEM 
A Description 
The focus of this dissertation lS the prediction that 
outcomes have implications for self systems of individuals, 
and that responsibility attributions made for outcomes re-
flect this relationshipo Attributions are self-protective 
for relevant outcomes which are bad or unsuccessful; attri-
butions are self-enhancive for relevant outcomes which are 
good or successful. 
The present conception of "self systems" includet. 
three components: self esteem, self image, and ego ideal 
(ideal self)o Ego ideal refers to what an individual 
ideally aspires to beo 
actually sees himself. 
Self image refers to the way one 
(Self confidence, one~s view of his 
own adaptive abilities, can be considered one component of 
self image, but self image also includes things such as 
material possessions and health)o Self esteem is a result 
of the discrepancy between the self image and the ego ideal. 
If the self image and the ego ideal are similar, self esteem 
lS higho If the self image is perceptibly lower than the 
ego ideal, then self esteem lS low. 
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Several measures of self esteem utilize the self image 
versus ego ideal discrepancy as their bases of self esteem. 
The Q-sort (Stephenson, 1935) is an example of a measure 
using this discrepancy. In a self concept Q-sort, an indi~ 
vidual typically divides a set of personality descriptive 
items into nine piles. On one sort the individual is to 
place items in piles so as to construct a continuum varying 
on the degree to which items are representative of himself, 
as he presently sees himself. Thus, one endpoint pile re-
flects descriptions most representative of the person; the 
other endpoint contains items least descriptive of the 
person. Next, the individual is instructed to resort the 
items on a continuum expressing characteristics of his ideal 
for himself. A correlation coefficient is computed as a 
measure of relationship between these sorts. High positive 
correlations reflect high self esteem, while lower correla-
tions reflect lower self esteem. 
Bills, Vance, and McLean (1951) developed a similar, 
popular adjective check list, in which a subject checks a 
description of himself, satisfaction with himself, and his 
ideal self. The ego ideal versus self image discrepancy lS 
again calculated. Worchel (1957) and LaForge and Suczek 
(1955) have developed similar check lists. 
The importance of these various methods of measuring 
self esteem for this dissertation is minimal. What is im-
portant is that they reflect the belief of other psycholo-
gists that self esteem is measured by the self-ideal discre-
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pancy, and that self esteem, self image and ego ideal are 
the components of the self system. Such a system indicates 
how self esteem can be influenced. Events which raise self 
image raise self esteem by decreasing the self image-ego 
ideal discrepancy. Events which lower self image lower self 
esteem by increasing the self image-ego ideal discrepancy. 
Outcomes and the Self System--Theory 
Carl Rogers (1951) stated: 
He (an individual) appears to value those experiences 
which he perceives as enhancing himself, and to place 
a negative value on those experiences which seem to 
threaten himself or which do not maintain or enhance 
himself (p. 499). 
William James (1892), whose theory bears special rele-
vance to this dissertation, came to a similar conclusion. 
James described three components of the self-as-object (ME). 
Me.is defined as the sum total of all that a person can call 
his own. The components of Me are: (1) the constituents of 
Me; (2) the emotions to which those constituents give rise; 
and (3) the acts that result from those emotions. James 
lists three classes of constituents of Me: (1) the material 
self; (2) the social selves; and (3) the spiritual self. 
Of present importance is the spiritual self, which includes 
an individual's conception of his abilities and skills. It. 
is theorized by James that, if one's perception of his abil-
ities are favorable (e.g., he has a successful outcome), then 
he feels happy, feeling happy reflecting "the emotions to 
which those constituents give rise." If those perceptions 
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are unfavorable (e.g., he has an unsuccessful outcome), then 
bad feelings are experienced. 
According to James, the type of emotion felt about an 
outcome mandates the acts that result from those emotions. 
Self-preservation actions follow from threats to the self 
and bad feelings. Self-seeking actions. follow from positive 
implications to. the self and good feelings. Thus, similar 
to Rogers (1951), James predicts that self-enhancement fol-
lows from good outcomes, and self-maintenance follows from 
bad outcomes. 
Importantly, James (1892) proposed that emotions re-
flect implications of actions and outcomes upon the self 
system. Rogers (1951) also believed that pleasant emotions 
follow from enhancing experiences, and unpleasant emotions 
follow from negative experiences. Rogers also added that 
the intensity of emotional reactions should vary directly 
with the importance of outcomes to the self. The more 
important the outcome, the.stronger the associated emotion. 
Finally, it can also be seen that James (1892) anti-
cipates the present model's prediction that respo~sibility 
attributions for outcomes (acts resulting from emotions) will 
reflect the relevance of those outcomes to self systems. 
For example,. an impersonal responsibility attribution by an 
actor who suffers an unsuccessfpl outcome would be a self-
preserving action. A personal responsibility att~ibution 
by an actbr who has a successful outcome would be a self-
seeking action. 
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Outcomes and the Self System--Research 
A study by Koocher (1971) was designed to see if 
increasing competence over one's environment enhanced self 
esteem, and if failure to increase this competence decreased 
self esteem. His subjects at a summer camp were boys who 
either learned to swim during camp, or did not develop swim-
ming ability. Learning to swim was stressed for boys in the 
camp. Each boy's self concept was measured on a modified 
version of the Index of Adjustment and Values (Bills, Vance, 
& McLean, 1951), both at the beginning and at the end of 
camp. It was·found that the boys who learned to swim during 
camp reflected an enhanced self esteem at the end of camp. 
Boys who did not learn to swim did not show any significant 
self esteem changes, i. e., no lowering of self esteem for 
failure. 
Wylie (1961) reviewed literature on the effects of 
success and failure on self esteem. Her conclusion paral-
leled the results of Koocher (1971). She found that evid-
ence indicates that self esteem rises after success, but 
rarely has self esteem been found to fall after failure. 
Diller (1954), however, found that subjects who were told 
that they had failed on a faked intelligence test did not 
report "overt" decreases in.self esteem, but did reveal a 
decrease in self esteem on a more "covert" scale. That ls, 
they did not openly report a less of self esteem following 
failure, but experienced disappointment which they attempted 
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to disguise. Apparently, one way to protect self esteem lS 
by not giving others an opportunity to lower it by their 
opinions. Successftil outcomes on this intelligence test pro~ 
duced both overt and covert rises in self esteem. 
Hence, research does indicate that outcomes potentially 
affect self systems. Success nearly always produces eleva-
tions in self esteem, although failure may not produce self 
esteem decreases. According to the present conception of 
self systems, these changes in self esteem are derived from 
changes in self image, or how the individual currently sees 
himself. 
If all outcomes were to affect self systems, then self 
systems would be very unstable. Self esteem would rise or 
fall with every success or failure, joy or sadness. However, 
the self system is more stable than this. Rises and falls 
in self esteem do occur, as depression and feelings of worth-
lessness are sometimes experienced by everyone. Yet, these 
changes in self systems are not as volatile as events 
occurring to and around individuals. 
Actualization theorists, such as Roger, have maintained 
that there is a tendency for rises in self esteem over time, 
and Engel (1959) found an increase ln favorability of self 
esteem in a group of subjects over a two year period. This 
data corresponds to Wylie's (1961) conclusion that self 
enhancement occurs more frequently than decreases in self 
esteem occur. These trends indicate that, apparently, there 
is a capacity in individuals to find self image elevating 
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information in favorable outcomes, but to avoid self image 
lowering information in unfavorable outcomes. It is pro-
posed here that responsibility attributions are the mechan-
isms by which individuals achieve the ability to associate 
the self system with good outcomes, and dissociate the self 
system from bad outcomes. Motivated by-:the self system, 
individuals tend to attribute responsibility toward them-





It has been proposed that successful and unsuccessful 
outcomes for an actor present the self system with different 
problems. Good outcomes must be accepted into the self 
system, thereby increasing the self image and bringing about 
a corresponding rise in self esteem. Bad outcomes must be 
prevented from becoming part of the self system, thereby 
preventing a lowering of the self system. Further, personal 
responsibility attributions (e.g., "I produced this good 
outcome.") are the means by which good outcomes are incor-
porated into the self system, and that impersonal responsi~ 
bility attributions (e.g., "My environment produced this bad 
outcome.") are the means by which bad outcomes are prevented 
from becoming part of the self system. 
To support this proposition, it must be found that 
actors who have good outcomes do actually claim personal 
responsibility, and actors who have unsuccessful outcomes 
claim impersonal responsibility. Few tests of this proposi-
tion have been conducted (e.g., Beckman, 1970; Finney, Helm 3 
& Fromme, Note 1). However, several indirect tests have 
13 
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been made in studies which compared the responsibility 
attributions of actors to unbiased observers for either good 
or bad outcomes. These experiments have .often dealt with 
information-processing, following the proposition made by 
Jones and Nisbett (1972). According to the information-
processing viewpoint, because of differences in available 
information (e.g., Actors have available to them information 
about their past behavior in relevant past situations, but 
observers do not often have this information available.) and 
in the processing of that information, observers tend to 
attribute personal responsibility for outcomes, while actors 
tend to attribute impersonal responsibility for outcomes. 
Given the moderate personal responsibility attributions for 
outcomes suggested by these studies as "typical" for 
unaroused, unbiased observers, support for the self system 
proposition would be found if actors were to assign as much 
or more personal responsibility for good outcomes, and less 
personal responsibility for bad outcomes, as unbiased obser-
vers assign. The implication is that outcomes are more 
relevant and arousing to the self systems of actors than of 
unbiased observers, and hence responsibility attributions of 
actors should vary more with the outcome than would the 
responsibility attributions of unbiased observers. 
It should be nQted that the information-processing 
approach (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Miller & Ross, 1975; Ross, 
Bierbrauer, & Polly, 1975) generates different predictions 
about the attributions of successful actors than the self 
15 
system proposition predicts. Information-processing pre-
diets that regardless of outcome, actors attribute more 
impersonal responsibility than do unbiased observers. 
Consideration of self systems, however, leads to the pre~ 
diction that actors will claim as much personal responsi-
bility for a good outcome as unbiased observers attribute. 
Thus, a survey of the literature regarding good outcomes 
should reveal how adequately the information-processing 
approach can predict an actor's responsibility attributions. 
Data from actors' attri~utions for good outcomes should 
reveal if this more parsimonious explanation is sufficient, 
or if self system considerations shou~d be included with 
information-processing considerations to improve the fit of 
theory to data. First, however, responsibility attributions 
for neutral or bad outcomes, where information-processing 
and self system models coincide, will be surveyed. 
Neutral and Negative Outcome Data 
Both the information-processing approach and self sys-
tem theory predict that a tendency for actors to not claim 
responsibility for neutral or negative outcomes. The 
information-processing approach predicts that responsibility 
will be attributed to circumstances rather than to the ~elf 
because of the actor's awareness of his environment; the 
self system approach predicts that this awareness of the 
environment is motivated by the self system's search for 
an attribution which will not be self-deprecating. The 
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responsibility attribution data is the same in either case. 
Although research for these outcomes does not discriminate 
between approaches, it seems to support thess predictions. 
McArthur (1972) asked subjects either to participate in 
an experiment in interpersonal relations (actors) or to read 
~ written account of the experiment and the actor's involve-
ment in it. Both actors and observers were then asked to 
attribute responsibility for the actor's agreement to parti-
cipate in the experiment. Results indicated that actors 
attributed their participation more to the importance of 
research (impersonal responsibility) than to their own per-
sonal desire to volunteer for research (personal responsi-
bility). Observers reversed the pattern, considering the 
actor's participation more a function of personal responsi-
bility than of impersonal responsibility, and validating the 
belief that unbiased observers tend to make personal respon-
sibility attributions. 
Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, and Marecek (1973) required 
an observer to watch an actor either comply or not comply to 
a request to volunteer his services for a university project. 
Both actor and observer were then asked to predict whether 
or not the actor would volunteer for future projects. 
Results indicated th~t observers believed that the actors 
who volunteered for this project would volunteer for future 
projects, and actors who did not volunteer for this project 
would not volunteer for future projects. Observers thus 
expressed their belief in personal dispositions as accounting 
• 
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for the volunteering act. Actors, on the other hand, did 
not predict future volunteering on the basis of their present 
actions, indicating that the situation was more important 
than personal characteristics in their decision. 
Finney, Merrifield, and Helm (in press) asked subjects 
to attribute responsibility for a scenario accident as ob~· 
. servers and as they felt the actor would. The accident 
clearly could have been prevented by the actor. When 
assigning responsibility as observers, subjects attributed 
more responsibility to the actor than to fate. When assign-
ing responsibility as the actor, subjects reversed this 
attribution, assigning more responsibility to fate than to 
the actor. 
Thus, research utilizing evaluatively neutral or nega-
tive events have shown that actors tend to attribute respon-
sibility for these events to impersonal responsibility, 
while observers tend to assign personal responsibility for 
these same events. Both the information-processing and 
self system explanations predict these results. 
Positive Outcome Data 
Information-processing theory (Jones g Nisbett, 1972) 
does not distinguish responsibility attributions by actors 
on the basis of outcomes. Therefore, this theory predicts 
that actors make impersonal responsibility attributions for 
good outcomes as well as for bad outcomes. Self system 
considerations lead to the prediction that, since good out-
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comes are self-enhancing, actors are motivated to accept 
responsibility for them, and will attribute personal respon-
sibility for good outcomes. As shall be seen, the prepon-
derance of evidence fits the self system interpretation, and 
not the information-processing interpretation. 
Only Ruble (1973) has reported attributions for good 
outcomes which parallel those for negative and neutral out-
comes. However~ Ruble (1973) is the weakest of the experi-
ments to be cited in this review. A check of a success-
failure manipulation was not made, so it cannot be known if 
subjects actually perceived a difference in the sentence 
description of outcomes. These sentences described either 
"good" or "bad 11 outcomes (e.g., "you/John didn't work well 
with others on a project"), and subjects were asked to attri-
bute responsibility (actor versus environment) for each 
event. It was found that subjects attributed more personal 
responsibility as observers than they did as the actor, 
regardless of the outcome of the event, indicating that 
actors seek impersonal explanations of behavior and outcomes. 
It is possible that the subjects did not make different 
a~tributions for successful and unsuccessful outcomes because 
they did not perceive that these outcomes were, in fact, 
different. As can be seen from the example above, the 
"success" and "failure 11 outcomes used by Ruble weren't clear 
success/failure situations, rather more-or-less descriptions 
of modes of interaction. Thus, only qualified evidence 
favoring the information-processing explanation with success-
ful outcomes can be claimed from Ruble (1973). 
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On the other hand, as a part of the study by Harvey, 
Arkin, Gleason, and Johnston (1974) subjects either assumed 
the role of therapist for a person with a minor phobia, or 
observed a similar therapeutic setting. After the session 
both actors and observers were told the actual outcome (pos-
itive or negative) of the therapy. Then, both actor and 
observer subjects were asked to assess responsibility for 
the outcome attributable to the actor and to situational 
factors. Actors subsequently attributed more responsibility 
to thems~lves for positive than for negative outcomes. 
Observers' attributions did not vary across the outcome main 
effect. 
Finney, Helm, and Fromme (Note 1) found similar results. 
Subjects in this experiment were g1ven a booklet containing 
six brief, abstract stories--one at each of the six levels 
of commission proposed by Heider (1958) and amended by 
Whiteside (Note 3). Half of the subjects received stories 
with good outcomes; the other half received stories with bad 
outcomes. Subjects attributed responsibility for the out-
come of each story from their own viewpoint and as they felt 
the actor would. The results indicated that for positive 
outcomes the subjects believed actors would attribute as 
much responsibility to themselves as observers would. How-
ever, for negative outcomes the subjects saw actors as 
attributing significantly less responsibility to themselves 
than observers would, but only when the situation (level of 
co~ission) was ambiguous enough for there to be doubt as to 
20 
the actor's responsibility level. These results indicate· 
that individuals believe that actors, relative to observers 
whose self systems are not related to outcomes, vary their 
attributions in o~der to enhance or protect their self 
systems. 
Gilmor and Minton (1974) also afford information on an 
actor's attributions under conditions of success and failure. 
Their subjects solved a set of anagram problems and then 
were told that they had performed better (successful) or 
worse (unsuccessful) than most other subjects. Then, each 
subject attributed responsibility for his outcome on a scale 
marked "mainly due to ability" at one extreme (personal 
responsibility) and "mainly due to luck" at the other extreme 
(impersonal responsibility). It was subsequently found that 
subjects who were successful made significantly greater in-
ternal (ability attributions) than did subjects who failed. 
Thus, Gilmor and Minton (1974) also demonstrate that actors 
will accept more responsibility for a successful outcome 
than for an unsuccessful outcome. 
Beckman (1970) found that teachers of children who· had 
successful learning outcomes attributed more responsibility 
to themselves for the'outcome than did teachers of children 
who had unsuccessful outcomes. Observers' personal respon-
sibility attributions for teachers were not affected by the 
learning outcome of the child, as would be expectedo The 
outcome did not have significance for their self systems. 
In a similar experiment, Johnson, Feigebaum, and Weiby (1964) 
obtained these same results. 
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Thus, actors are apparently motivated to accept person-
al responsibility for favorable outcomes. The information-
processing approach, exemplified by Jones and Nisbett (1972), 
.does not account for these attributions; but, wh~n the rele-
vance of the self system of an actor to outcomes is consi-
dered within the model, these attributions can be understood. 
The Self System and Actor Attributions 
There is clear evidence to show that actors disclaim 
personal responsibility for unsuccessful (bad) and neutral 
outcomes. Also, the bulk of present evidence shows that 
actors seem quite willing to accept responsibility for a 
successful, good outcome. Again, this data indicates that, 
·in addition to the present information-processing theory; a 
motivational aspect to attributions must also be considered. 
Individuals seen to actively seek to maintain or enhance 
their self systems, both as seen by themselves and as seen 
by others. The self 1 s desire to be seen positively moti-
vates attributions by an actor and also, as shall be seen 
later, by the observer. As a corrolary to this proposition, 
it can be added that the more a particular negative outcome 
is relevant to (arouses) and threatens one 1 s self system, or 
the more a positive outcome is relevant to (arouses) and 
enhances one's self system, the greater the effect of the 
self system on attributions. 
The suggestion that motivation from the self influences 
the attribution process is not new, but it has largely been 
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ignored. Several experiments (Beckman, 1970; Fitch, 1970; 
Harvey, Arkin, Gleason, & Johnston, 1974; Mischel, Mailer, & 
Zeiss, Note 4) have proposed that self factors motivate an 
actor's attribution of responsibility to himself for a posi-
tive outcome. As Heider (1944) stated: 
It is obvious that this tendency to keep the ego level 
high must play a role in attribution. Since origins 
are assimilated to acts attributed to them, an actt of 
low value, when attributed to the ego, will lower the 
ego level, and an act of high value will raise it 
(p. 368). 
Hastorf, Schneider, and Polefka (1970) made the same 
conclusion, stating: 
We are prone to alter our perception of causality so 
as to protect or enhance our self esteem. We attri-
bute success to our own dispositions and failure to 
external forces (p. 73). 
Weiner and Kukla (1970) also indicated a need for self 
system maintenance or enhancement which influences peoples' 
responsibility attributions. Their research indicates that 
self-punishment is strongest when one's efforts fall short 
of his ability in a particular task. A way of avoiding 
self-punishment, and possibly punishment or condemnation 
from others would be to attribute impersonal, environmental 
responsibility for bad outcomes, and therefore preserve the 
self system. It follows that an actor with a successful 
outcome.would desire a self-enhancing attribution of personal 
responsibility, and attribute personal responsibility for 
such outcomes. Rubin and Peplau (Note 5) reflect the self 
enhancing or deprecating potential of outcomes. They found 
that subjects who received a good outcome by chance tended 
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.to experience an 1ncrease 1n self esteem, but those who by 
chance received a bad outcome tended to lose self esteem. 
Finally, Frieze and Weiner (1971: Experiment I) con-
elude: 
Thus, there is a tendency to ascribe success to inter-
nal or personal sources, and failure to external or 
environmental factors. This suggests that locus of 
control influences affective reactions to an outcome, 
and that ego-enhancive and ego-defensive attributional 
tendencies are elicited in achievement contexts 
(p. 595). 
Frieze and Weiner (1971: Experiment II) did not find 
evidence to fully support this contention. Yet, the wealth 
of research for actors' attributions cited thus far makes 
the conclusion quite persuasive. 
Thus, although a direct test of the self system propo-
sition has not been made, evidence exists which suggests 
that an actor is motivated to protect or enhance his self 
esteem in light of the outcomes of his actions. As noted 
by Beckman (1970), maintenance (protection) of the self 
system should become important or aroused when a negative 
outcome befalls an actor, and he must protect himself from 
being associated with it; enhancement of the self system 
should be aroused and occur when the actor desires to assoc-
iate himself with the responsibility for a positive outcomeo 
Helm and Whiteside (Note 6) have demonstrated that actors 
can accurately predict when observers will rate them nega-
tively or positively for particular behavior. Thus, indi-
victuals are aware of how others might interpret their beha~ 
vior, and recognize situations in which personal responsi-
bility attributions could be enhancing or deprecating. 
The Self System and Information 
Processing 
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It should be emphasized here that the proposition that 
motivation from the self system is important in an actorVs 
responsibility attributions does not deny the information-
processing viewpoint that actors utilize information in 
their attributions which is either unavailable to, or pro~ 
cessed differently by, observers. Rather, self system con-
sideration adds another dimension to the information-
processing model. The self system approach essentially 
deals with the information-processing of actors, contending 
that the self system markedly influences attributions and 
the manner in which information is processed by actors. 
The actors' special information is presumably processed in a 
manner which will either protect or enhance the self system 
in light of outcomes. For bad outcomes actors will draw 
from evidence showing that they were not personally respon-
sible for outcomes; for good outcomes actors will employ 
evidence suggesting personal responsibility. 
Possibly the best way to stress this point lS by a 
specific, hypothetical example to show that self system 
motivation can be used to explain how an actor can use a 
single piece of information about past performance to make 
either personal or impersonal attributions for an outcome. 
These attributions depend on whether the outcome is success-
ful or unsuccessful. Assume that an actor has often been 
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successful in task A in the past, but now fails at it. This 
is a negative outcome. Motivated to preserve the self sys-
tem (in this case, a perception of ability at task A), the 
actor can appeal to past success with task A to say that it 
was not a lack of ability on his part which caused the pre-
sent failure. Rather, external forces, such as bad condi-
tions, bad luck, etc., caused this failure. The negative 
outcome led to an impersonal attribution of responsibility. 
Now, assume the same actor with the same successful 
history in task A succeeds on the present attempt. Motiva-
ted to enhance the self system, the actor appeals to the 
successful past as a demonstration that superior ability 
accounts for the present success. The positive outcome led 
to a personal attribution of responsibility, utilizing the 
same historical information as used before to establish 
impersonal responsibility for a bad outcome. 
Thus, depending on the outcome, one can make shifting 
appeals to the same information in an attempt to attach one-
self to desirable outcomes and enhance the self system, or 
to dissociate oneself from undesirable outcomes and maintain 
the self system. The information available to the actor, 
both from current circumstances and from the past, is always 
the vehicle by which the attributional case is presented. 
Current requirements for maintaining the self system pro-
duce processing of information which lead to denial of 
responsibility for an unsuccessful outcome; enhancement of 
the self system produces information which leads to accep-
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tance of responsibility for a successful outcome. Hence, 
self system motives dictate how information will be used in 
attributions. 
Contradicting Evidence 
Ross, Bierbrauer, and Polly (1974) interpret there-
sults of their experiment as shattering propositions that 
attributions are dependent on motivations from the self sys-
tem. Since Ross et al. (1974) seem quite convinced of the 
finality of their results, and since their experiment actu-
ally demonstrates problems in summarily rejecting self sys-
tem motivation in attributions, it is necessary to discuss 
their arguments. 
In Ross et al. (1974) professional teachers and college 
students with no teaching experience (non-professional) 
attempted to teach spelling to an 11-year old. The outcome 
was either good (successful) or poor (unsuccessful) spelling 
by the child. Observers watched the sessions involving non-
professional teachers, but no observers watched the sessions 
involving professional teachers. After the teaching ses-
sions, all teachers and observers rated the contribution to 
the outcome of several teacher factors (teaching ability, 
performance, adjustment to the situation, and technique) 
and several student factors (scholastic ability, aptitude 
for spelling, adjustment to the situation, and attention 
and motivation). 
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The experiment revealed that teachers (both professional 
and.non-professional) attributed relatively more personal 
(teacher) responsibility for the child's failure than for 
his success. Ross et al. concluded that this evidence 
directly contradicts a self system interpretation, as actors 
were attributing more responsibility to themselves for fail-
ure than for success. However~ a comparison of observers' 
and non-professional teachers' attributions found that obser-
vers placed even more responsibility on the non-professional 
teacher for failure, and even less responsibility for suc-
cess, than the non-professional teachers had themselves. 
Therefore, relative to unbiased observers' attributions, 
non-professional teachers (actors) accepted less responsi-
bility for failure and claimed responsibility for success, 
which is interpretable as self system protection. The fact 
that these actors' attributions appear to be defensive when 
compared to observers' attributions indicates that self 
system motivation was operating. 
A major weakness in.the Ross et al. (1974) experiment 
was that no observers viewed the professional teachers. 
Hence, no observer responsibility attributions for profes-
sional teachers are available for an observer-professional 
teacher comparison. It cannot be said whether the profes-
sionals' attributions, when compared to observers, would 
have been self-protective. Still, this lack of data cannot 
be used either against, or for, self system propositions. 
The most troublesome finding in Ross et al. (1974) lS 
that professionals attributed more responsibility to them-
selves for failure, and less for success, than did non-
professionals. On face value, it would seem that profes-
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sionals would be more defensive about their teaching ability 
than would non-professional teachers, and they would have 
attributed less responsibility to themselves for failure, 
and more for success, than would non-professionals. Yet, 
such an interpretation is valid only if the professionals' 
self systems were threatened or enhanced by the outcome. 
Therefore, these results are quite open to the interpretation 
that professional teachers, knowing their own professional 
ability and experiences, did not have their self systems 
unduly influenced by the child's outcome. The current 
failure of one student relative to successes they probably 
have had ln the past was not important enough to professional 
teachers to have their self system defenses aroused. Hence, 
their self systems were probably more stable, and less lia-
ble to fluctuate, than were those of non-professionals. 
Within the experimental setting, the professionals were 
able to assume modesty and accept responsibility for failure 
and give responsibility away for success. (Ross et al. did 
note" the possibility of this modesty in professional teach-
ers' attributions, but dismissed it.) On the other hand, 
the non-professional teachers did not have other teaching 
experiences upon which to base their attributions, and the 
impact of the child-confederate's outcome could have been 
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more self system arouslng to them. Quite possibly they were 
more threatened or elated by the outcome of the session than 
were professional teachers, and thus were either more self 
system protective or enhancive. Under this post hoc, self 
system arousal interpretation, Ross et al. (1974) lS con-
sistent with predictions which could be made from a self 
system viewpoint. 
This example shows that Ross et al's (1974) study is 
not destructive of theories which attempt to relate self 
systems to attributions, but is a testimonial to the need 
for carefully-planned research and careful interpretation. 
It points out well how two aspects of attribution research 
dealing with actors and observers must be carefully, consid-
ered. First, when comparisons of actor and observer attri-
butions are being used to test effects of the self system 
on attributions, all groups of actors must be paired with 
observers. Otherwise, important information is lost. 
Second, when comparing two different actor classifications, 
tests (or checks) of self system arousal must be made so 
that it can be known which group, actually, was the more 
aroused, and dependent on self system motivation for direc-
tion of their attributions. 
Social Facilitation, Actors and 
Self Systems 
Social facilitation theory (Zajonc, 1965) reasons that 
the presence of an audience increases a person's drive level 
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(level of motivation) while performing a task. The increase 
ln motivation, in turn, enhances the likelihood that an act-
or will react to his situation with his most probable re-
sponse,for that situation. Further, Henchy and Glass (1968) 
found that enhancement of these most likely reactions lS 
increased when evaluation of performance from the observers 
is anticipated. This implied future evaluation reflects the 
increased probability of challange to the actor's self sys-
tem, as the individual is more likely to have to face and 
defend his outcome at a later time. Indeed, Wapner and Al-
bert (1952) obtained results which led them to conclude that, 
"An audience may serve to threaten self-status" (p. 228). 
In the same line, McTeer (1953) had subjects perform in a 
laboratory with either their classroom psychology teacher or 
a stranger as the experimenter. Subjects in this study who 
performed before their instructors (evaluating observers), 
with whom they expected future interaction, showed greater 
signs of anxiety during the experiment than did subjects who 
performed for strangers. Thus, the more evaluation antici-
pated from an audience, the greater the threat to the self 
system. 
Since actors seem to expect more evaluation from a 
friend or associate than from a stranger, and express a 
greater anxiety (arousal) as a result of anticipated evalua-
tion and future interaction (McTeer, 1953), then dominant 
responses should be stronger when the actor is familiar with 
the audience than otherwise. If the dominant response for 
31 
success is a personal responsibility attribution by the act-
or (as proposed by the present model), then, according to 
the social facilitation concepts, the actor should attribute 
more personal responsibility for success ~hen observed by a 
friend than when observed by a stranger. Likewise, if the 
dominant response for failure is an impersonal responsibility 
attribution, then more impersonal responsibility for failure 
should be claimed by an unsuccessful actor when observed by 




To this point this discussion has shown how considera-
tion of an actor's self system can be used in the prediction 
of attributions. These studies have typ~cally involved 
observers whose attitudes toward the actors have been "neu-
tral." Yet, in "real life" our attributions as observers of 
others' behavior are not neutrally-made; we often have pre-
disposing attitudes toward actors (e.g., friendship or anl-
mosity) which color and bias our attributions. Four 
approaches to observer biases have been developed within 
social psychological theory. The first is in Jones and 
Davis' (1965) concepts of "hedonic relevance" and "personal~ 
ism." The second concerns Walster 1 s (1966) and Shaver~s 
(1970) concepts of defensive attribution. These concepts 
center on the personal or situational relevance of the actor 
(Walster, 1966; Shaver, 1970) and his actions (Jones & Davis, 
1965) to the observer. The third distinction has centered 
on the difference between ''active" and "passive" observers 
(e.g., Miller & Norman, in press). Finally, the fourth 
concept involves an observer's empathic set toward an actor 
(Regan & Totten, 1975). 
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Each of these approaches will be discussed. Then, each 
approach will be shown to be based on the relevance of the 
actor, his actions, and his situation to the self system of 
the observer. Thus, all biases of observers can be subsumed 
under self system factors, as are the biases which influence 
actor attributions. 
Hedonic Relevance and Personalism 
Jones and Davis' (1965) theory concerns the disposition 
indicated by an actor's actions. They considered both he-
donic relevance and personalism variables which affect ob-
servers' attributions of disposition about an actor. 
Hedonic relevance refers to an actor's actions which either 
promote or interfere with an observer's goals, yet were not 
directed specifically at the observer (impersonal relevance). 
Personalism refers to actions which are directed toward the 
observer (personal relevance). Jones and Davis (1965) sug-
gest that correspondence 1ncreases with increasing relevance 
(personal or impersonal)_ and that, with increasing corres-
pondence, the observer's attributions of favorable disposi-
tions to the actor increase when the effects of actions are 
positive, and attributions of unfavorable dispositions 
increase when the effects are negative. 
Research has supported these concepts. Chaikin and 
Cooper (1973) found that hedonic relevance which promoted 
an observer's goals increased reports of liking for a scen-
ario actor, and Potter (1973) found that increasing person-
alism increased appropriate liking or disliking for an 
actoro 
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Clearly, hedonic relevance and personalism alter obser-
ver attributions. Still, as stated by Jones and Davis 
(1965), hedonic relevance and personalism deal with disposi~ 
tional attributions, rather than attributions of responsi-
bilityo Also, these concepts concern actions which directly 
affect the observero Hedonic relevance and personalism do 
show, however, that relevance of an action to an observer 
affects the observer's attributions. These biases occur be~ 
cause certain actions affect observers indirectly, through 
perceptions of similarity to actors or to circumstances of 
actiono 
Defensive Attributions 
Walster (1966) found that the more severe the consequen-
ces of an accident, the more observers attributed personal 
responsibility to an actor for it. Though it has been dif-
ficult to duplicate these results (see Vidmar & Crinklaw, 
1974, for a review), the specific arguments as to whether or 
not the seriousness of an accident affects observer attri-
butions will not be discussed here. A brief mention of 
Walster's (1966) rationale for these results will be more 
helpfulo Walster (1966) hypothesized that observers would 
be motivated to dissociate themselves from an actor who 
caused a severe, negative outcome, in order to indicate that 
they would have behaved differently and thereby would have 
averted the accident. With the observer feeling that he 
could have avoided the bad outcome, he would defensively 
hold the actor highly responsible for not doing so. 
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Shaver (1970) noted that this situation would produce 
a "defensive" attribution, and concluded that at least two 
factors, personal and situational relevance, contributed to 
observers' defensiveness. Situational relevance occurs when 
the observer feels that he might someday experience a si tua-
tion similar to the actor's. Personal relevance occurs when 
the actor and the observer are linked in some way (e.g., by 
friendship or attitudes). Shaver (1970) feels that, when 
the observer cannot deny personal similarity to an actor, 
the observer (like the actor) is likely to attribute nega-
tive outcomes to situational responsibility, especially so 
under conditions of situational relevance. Although support 
for these propositions has been far from unanimous (see 
Vidmar & Crinklaw's, 1974, review), McKillip and Prosavak 
(1972) show that greater situational relevance decreases 
observers' attributions of personal responsibility for an 
accident, and Chaikin and Darley (1973) have found that 
greater personal or situational relevance decreases personal 
responsibility attributions to actors for bad outcomes. 
Regan, Strauss, and Fazio (1974) found that personal rele-
~~nce in the form of liking 6r disliking an actor influences 
~n observer'~ ·aitributions, in that good outcomes for liked 
actors and bad outcomes for disliked actors are attributed 
to pensonal responsibility. 
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Fromme (Note 7) has also discussed the observer who is 
a friend of an actor (personal relevance) involved in a com-
petitive situation. His predictions are similar to those 
suggested by defensive attribution considerations. Fromme 
believes that the affective bonds or feelings of "we" be-
tween the observer and the actor cause the actor's outcomes 
and feelings to be shared by the observer. Like the actor, 
a friend observer would, ther~fore, assign the actor's sue-
cess to personal responsibility and losses to impersonal 
responsibility. In addition, both the actor and the friend 
observer should assign impersonal responsibility to the 
actor's opponent's success, and personal responsibility to 
the opponent's failure. 
Active and Passive Observers 
as~· 
Miller and Norman (in press) define an active observer 
a participant in a social interaction situation who, 
in addition to observing the behavior of the other 
participants, influences the behavior of the other 
participants and is himself behaviorally influenced 
by the other participants (p. 1). 
Thus, an active observer not only observes the actions of 
others in a social situation, but also acts and is observed 
in turn by both co-actors and passive observers. This "ac-
tive" viewpoint is different than the typd.cal "passive ob-
server'" who: 
neither influences, nor is influenced by the actor 
he is observing (p. 1). 
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Miller and Norman (in press) found that in a conflict 
situation active observers attribute more personal responsi-
bility for the behavior of another actor (e.g., an opponent) 
than do passive observers. Miller and Norman conclude that 
this occurs because another actor's behavior is highly per-
sonalistic to an active observer; thus active observers in-
fer greater dispositional and responsibility attributions 
than do passive observers. 
Empathy 
Empathy deals with one person vicariously assumlng the 
role and feelings of another. Empathy within an actor-
observer framework usually involves the observer assuming 
the role, feelings, etc. of the actor in some situation. As 
discussed earlier, Finney, Merrifield, and Helm (in press) 
and Finney, Helm, and Fromme (Note 1) found that subjects 
could predict actor-like attributions in scenario research, 
indicating the ability of observers to empathically assume 
an actor's role. Also, Regan and Totten (1975) instructed 
one group of observers to empathize with one of two conver-
sants in a video-taped "get-acquainted" conversation, and 
did not instruct another group to do so. Results indicated 
that subjects instructed to take an empathic set attributed 
more situational and less dispositional responsibility for 
the actor's behavior than did standard observers. Regan and 
Totten (1975) concluded that shared emotional experiences, 
which were reported in the empathic situations may result 
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from the observer's assumption of an actor-like perspective 
toward the environmental contingencies surrounding the 
actor's behavior. 
The Self System and Observer Biases 
The four observer biases discussed here were presented 
as distinct concepts, yet it will be shown that they are 
interrelated both in and of themselves, and also by a more 
predominant motivation, support or enhancement of the self 
system. Within these concepts, it has already been observed 
that Jones and Davis' (1965) hedonic relevance and personal-
ism are related to the attributions of active observers. 
These concepts deal with observers who are, ln one way or 
another, the target of an action. Defensive attributions 
are attributions of passive observers, who are not the tar-
gets of actions, but who share personal or situational Slml-
larity with actors. For active observers, actions are the 
most salient factor for self system arousal; for passi~e 
observers, the actor and his situation is most salient. 
Empathic attributions deal with an observer's ability 
to imagine the circumstances and feelings of the actor. 
The ability of an observer to empathize with the actor is 
largely drawn from the observer's own experiences. His own 
feelings and actions in similar situations are the prime 
base for his empathic inferences to the current actor. 
Thus, situational or personal relevance of the actor to the 
observer should increase the observer's ability to empathize 
with the actor, as these conditions of relevance g1ve the 
observer a base on which to make empathic attributions. 
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It should be apparent at this point that each of these 
observer biases increase the~ relationship or bonds between 
the observer and the actor. Hedonic relevance, personalism, 
situational relevance, personal relevance, active rather 
than passive observing, and increased empathic ability each 
involve increased similarity between actor and observer, 
thereby giving the observer certain actor-like characteris-
tics. It follows that, if the predominant bias on an ac-
tor's attributions is self system motivation, this motiva-
tion should also influence the attributions of an observer 
who is ~omewhat like the actor. Thus, eachrof the four con-
cepts discussed here can be considered as different manners 
in which the observer's self system motivation influences 
his attributions. 
The passive observer of a: personally or situationally 
relevant friend who has a good outcome should consider that 
outcome a product of personal responsibility of the actor. 
By making this attribution, the observer would enhance his 
self esteem by expressing the belief that he is a person who 
associates himself with persons who produce good outcomes 
(personal relevance) or is similar to persons who produce 
good outcomes (situational relevance), and he should be 
expected to produce these outcomes, also. 
In the case of the defensive attributions of pass1ve 
observers, an observer who is a friend to an actor suffering 
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a negative or bad outcome should, because of the personal 
and situational relevance of their relationship, direct im-
personal responsibility attributions 1:oward the actor. In 
circumstances of personal or situational relevance, condem-
nation of the actor by the observer would be tantamount to a 
self-condemnation, with the implication that the observer 
commonly associates himself with those who experience bad 
outcomes (losers), and expects bad outcomes for himself. 
Leniency toward an actor friend is self-protective for the 
passive observer. 
Passive observers of actors who are strangers have been 
shown to regularly attribute personal responsibility to them 
(McArthur, 1972; Nisbett, Caputo, Legan±, & Marecek, 1973). 
Yet, evidence exists which suggests that these individuals 
are not entirely uninfluenced by outcomes. To a lesser 
degree than those who are acquainted with the actors, their 
attributions are also influenced to self system motivations. 
Shaw and Skolnick (1971) suggest that it is important for 
people to beleive that good outcomes are distributed among 
all people. Thus, it is reassuring and self-protective for 
observers who are unrelated to actors to infer that good 
outcomes to others are somewhat more a result of situational 
responsibility than are bad outcomes to others. Shaw and 
Skolnick (1971) and Stephen (1975) found evidence to support 
this contention, especially as the intensity of the good 
outcome increased. Also, Shaw and Sulzer (1964), testing 
across Heider's (1958) five levels of commission for good 
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and bad outcomes, found that greater personal responsibility 
was assigned for a bad outcome than for a good outcome. 
This supports Shaw and Skolnick's hypothesis that an obser-
yer's responsibility attributions for good outcomes for 
others are somewhat based on self system defensiveness. 
Still, present arguments contend that increasing the rela-
tionship between observer and actor increases this defensive-
~ess, expressed both by emotion and by attribution. 
Next, imagine the case of an active observer who obser-
ves a bad outcome for another produced by, or coexistent 
with, a good outcome for himself. He should attribute re-
sponsibility for the other's outcome to personal responsi-
bility as a way to say that, relative to his own ability, 
the other's inability (at the task) produced the bad outcome. 
Other'times, the other's good outcome coexists with an 
actor's own bad outcome. In this case, the actor should 
attribute the good outcome to impersonal responsibility as a 
way to say that external factors, such as luck, caused both 
the good and bad outcomes. Both these attributions serve to 
either protect or enhance the active observer's self system. 
Finally, passive observers who are related to actors 
should attribute responsibility for another actor's outcomes 
in the same manner as their friend actors do. Passive ob~ 
servers who are unrelated to actors should not differentiate 
responsibility attributions between competing actors. 
CHAPTER V 
HYPOTHESES 
A Methodological Overview 
Method 
The present experiment required sets of two subjects 
(strangers) to compete in a message-modified Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game (PDG)o At the conclusion of the game, one 
player was declared the winner, while the other player was 
named the losero Also, during the competition each player 
was observed by either a friend or a stranger, thus creating 
actor-observer dyads consisting of friends or strangers. 
The PDG was chosen over other possible competitive in~ 
teractions so as to guarantee the unfamiliarity of all sub-
jects with the experimental situation, and to be able to 
provide a clear win/loss outcome in a free, nondeceptive 
interaction. 
Dependent Variables 
Responsibility. Subsequent to the competition and the 
determination of winner and loser, every subject (actors and 
observers) attributed responsibility for both the winning 
and the losing actor's outcomes. The primary method of 
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determining personal and impersonal responsibility attribu-
tions was to ask subjects to assign a given actor's respon-
sibility for his outcome on. a continuum labeled from "Him-
self" to "The Circumstances." 
Emotions. The theory of self presented by James (1892) 
and the data of Rubin and Peplau (Note 4) suggest that the 
potential effects of outcomes on the self system are, in 
fact, represented by emotions. Subjects in the present 
study rated their feelings about each player's outcome in 
the experiment. This measure of feelings about outcomes was 
expected to reflect the impact of the outcome on the self 
system of the subject. 
Independent Variables and Analyses 
Four independent variables were included in the respon-
sibility attribution and emotion analyses" These are Out-
come, Dyad, Viewpoint, and Ratee. 2x2x2x2 analyses of vari-
ance were performed on the responsibility and emotion attri-
butions. These analyses were not directly summarized or 
evaluated for their results, as the following hypotheses 
concerned comparisons of means from individual cells in the 
higher order interactions. The summary analyses of variance 
were used to supply error terms for these comparisons. 
Each independent variable contained two levels. The 
two levels of Outcome reflected whether the actor making the 
attribution, or the actor observed by the observer making 
the attribution, was (1) the winner or (2) the loser; the 
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two levels of Dyad denoted (1) friendship and (2) stranger; 
the two levels of Viewpoint determine (1) the actor and 
(2) the observer; and the two levels of Ratee (person being 
rated) denoted ratings of (1) the actor within the actor-
observer dyad (ingroup) and (2) the actor of the other dyad 
(other group). Outcome, Dyad, and Viewpoint were between-
subjects factors, while Ratee was a within-subject factor, 
as it involved attributions made by one person about respon-
sibility of the ingroup actor versus the othergroup actor. 
Formulation of Hypotheses 
An Overview of the Hypotheses 
Eight sets of hypotheses will be presented for this 
experiment. Each set concerns emotions and responsibility 
attributions made by a limited set of subjects (e.g., the 
attributions of actors about their own outcomes). Each 
hypothesis involves a simple comparison between the means of 
two sets of subjects (e.g., attributions of actors who had 
successful outcomes and were observed by friends, versus 
attributions of actors who had successful outcomes and were 
observed by strangers). 
Hypothesis Sets 1 and 5 concern emotions and responsi-
bility attributions actors express about their own and their 
opponent's outcomes, respectively. Hypothesis Sets 2 and 6 
concern emotions and responsibility attributions observers 
express about the outcomes of the actors they observed and 
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of the opposlng actors, respectively. Hypothesis Sets 3 and 
7 compare emotions and responsibility attributions expressed 
by actors and by observers for successful outcomes of the 
actors within the dyads and successful outcomes of the oppo-
nents, respectively. Hypothesis Sets 4 and 8 compare emo-
tions and responsibility attributions expressed by actors 
and by observers for unsuccessful outcomes of the actors 
within the dyads and unsuccessful outcomes of the opponents, 
respectively. Thus, Hypothesis Sets 1 through 4, and hypo-
theses within sets, parallel Hypothesis Sets 5 through 8; 
the difference is that Hypothesis Sets 1 through 4 deal with 
ratings of the outcome of the actors within dyads, and Hypo-
thesis Sets 5 through 8 deal with ratings of opponents' 
outcomes. 
Each Hypothesis Set contains two or three orthogonal 
emotion hypotheses and two or three orthogonal responsibil-
ity hypotheses. Each responsibility hypothesis concerns 
comparisons of means for responsibility attributions. Emo-
tion hypotheses concern comparisons of means for emotion 
attributions. Each emotion hypothesis has a corresponding 
responsibility hypothesis. 
Within a Hypothesis Set, (responsibility or emotion) 
hypothesis "a" concerns attributions within friendship 
dyads, hwile hypothesis "b" concerns attributions within 
stranger dyads. Occassionally, corollaries will be presen-
ted. Corollaries deal with dyadic attributions, where 
attributions by actors and by observers within a dyad are 
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not distinguishedo That is, the Viewpoint variable is col-
lapsed within corollaries. Also, hypotheses without "a" or 
"b" suffixes concern attributions of actors or observers, 
without regard to the dyad relationship in which they are 
involved. That is, hypotheses without "a" or "b" subscripts 
are collapsed across the Dyad variable. Another way to 
state this is that hypotheses with "a" or 11 b 11 subscripts 
involve comparisons of means found in the Outcome X Dyad X 
Viewpoint X Ratee interaction, while hypotheses without the 
11 a 11 or "b 11 subscripts, and corollary hypotheses, involve 
comparisons of means from the Outcome X Dyad X Ratee and 
Outcome X Viewpoint X Ratee interactions, respectively. 
Statistical Comments 
None of the following responsibility hypotheses, emotion 
hypotheses, responsibility corollaries, or emotion corollar-
ies are directly tested by specific main effects or inter-
actions of the pr~mary responsibility or emotion analyses of 
variance. Instead, they are tested by specific comparisons 
of means within various interactions. Accordingly, in the 
following section the background for each Hypothesis Set 
will be established, followed by a descriptive sentence 
stating the hypotheses (responsibility and emotion), finally 
followed by a statement of the hypotheses in statistical 
form. 
For the sake of clarity in the following discussion of 
hypotheses and comparisons of means, the following list of 








Hypothesis Set 1 
1 = Successful 2 = Unsuccessful 
1 = Friendship 2 = Stranger 
1 = Actor 2 = Observer 
1 = Ingroup 2 = Othergroup 
If outcomes have relevance to the self systems of 
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of actors, then this relevance should be reflected by emo-
tions expressed about outcomes. Good feelings should be 
expressed by actors about good outcomes, thereby reflecting 
the ego-enhancing capability of such outcomes. Personal 
responsibility attributions should follow from such outcomes 
and emotions. Bad feelings should be expressed by actors 
about bad outcomes, thereby reflecting the ego-deflating 
potential of those outcomes. Environmental responsibility 
attributions should follow from such outcomes and emotions. 
Supporting these concepts, evidence previously pre-
sented (e.g., Beckman, 1970; Gilmor & Minton, 1974; Finney, 
Helm, & Fromme, Note 1) suggests that actors accept more 
personal responsibility for successful personal outcomes 
than for unsuccessful·personal outcomes. 
Emotion Hypothesis 1: Actors who have successful out-
comes will express better feelings about these out-
comes than will actors who have unsuccessful out-
comes. 
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Responsibility Hypothesis 1~ Actors who have success-
ful outcomes will attribute more personal responsi-
bility for these outcomes than will actors who have 
unsuccessful outcomes. 
In addition to these general predictions, according to 
social facilitation theory (Zajonc, 1965; Henchy & Glass, 
1968) the presence of an audience has motivating properties 
on an actor, and expectations for increases in interaction 
and evaluation from the audience increases this motivation. 
This heightened arousal should be reflected in higher levels 
of self system motivation in the actor when he is observed 
by a friend than when he is observed by a stranger. Thusr 
actors should feel better about successful outcomes, and 
worse about unsuccessful outcomes, when observed by friends 
than when observed by strangers, reflecting the heightened 
motivation derived from an evaluating audience. Actors 
should attribute more personal responsibility for good out~ 
comes, and less for bad outcomes, when observed by a friend 
than when observed by a stranger. 
Emotion Hypothesis la: Actors who have successful out-
comes and are observed by friends will feel better 
about those outcomes than will actors who have 
successful outcomes and are observed by strangers. 
Responsibility Hypothesis la: Actors who have success-
ful outcomes and are observed by friends will attri-
bute more personal responsibility for those outcomes 
than will actors who have successful outcomes and 
are observed by strangers. 
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Emotion Hypothesis lb: Actors who have unsuccessful 
outcomes and are observed by friends will feel worse 
about those outcomes than will actors who have un-
successful outca.mes and are observed by strangerso 
Responsibility Hypothesis lb: Actors who. have unsuc-
cessful outcomes and are observed by friends will 
attribute less personal responsibility for those 
outcomes than will actors who have unsuccessful out-
comes and are observed by strangerso 
Support for Emotion and Responsibility Hypotheses 1 
would be found in a significant comparison between levels of 
A at c1n1 in the emotion and r~sporisibility attributions, 
respectively. Support for Emotion and Responsibility Hypo-
theses la would occur ln a significant comparison between 
levels of B at A1c1n1 ln the emotion and responsibility 
attributions, respectively. Support for Emotion and Respon-
sibility Hypotheses lb would be found ln a significant com-
parison between levels of B at A2c1n1 in the emotion and 
responsibility attributions, respectively. 
Hypothesis Set 2 
It has been proposed that an observer's relationship 
with an actor is part of the observer's self system, and 
an actor's outcomes should be relevant to the observer. To 
show that an actor's outcome does, actually, have ego-
relevant implications for a friend who observes him, it 
must be shown that a friend's reaction to the actor's out-
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come is different than the reaction of a stranger. Friends 
should feel better about successful outcomes, and feel worse 
about unsuccessful outcomes, than do strangers. Accordingly, 
friends of actors should also attribute more personal re-
sponsibility for success, and less personal responsibility 
for failure, than would strangers. 
Evidence has been presented (Shaver, 1970; Regan & 
Totten, 1975; Fromme, Note 7) suggesting that observers who 
are friends of actors do attribute responsibility for 
friends' outcomes more as the friend than as an observer who 
is unrelated to the actor. 
Emotion Hypothesis 2a: Observers who have watched 
friends have successful outcomes will express bet-
ter feelings about those outcomes than will obser-
vers who have watched strangers have successful 
outcomes. 
Responsibility Hypothesis 2a: Observers who have 
watched friends have successful outcomes will attri-
bute more personal responsibility for those outcomes 
than will observers who have watched strangers have 
successful outcomes. 
Emotion Hypothesis 2b: Observers who have watched 
friends have unsuccessful outcomes will express 
worse feelings about those outcomes than will obser-
vers who have watched strangers have unsuccessful 
outcomes. 
Responsibility Hypothesis 2b: Observers who have , 
watched friends have unsuccessful outcomes will 
attribute less personal responsibility for those 
outcomes than will observers who have watched 
strangers have unsuccessful outcomes. 
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Emotion and Responsibility Hypotheses 2a would each be 
supported by a significant comparison between levels of B at 
A1 C2D1 of the emotion and responsibility attributions, re-
spectively. Emotion and Responsibility Hypotheses 2b would 
each be supported by a significant comparison between levels 
of B at A2c2D1 of the emotion and responsibility attribu-
tions, respectively. 
Hypothesis Set 3 
Hypothesis Sets 1 and 2 compared attributions by actors 
and by observers, respectively, for successful and unsuccess-
ful outcomes. Hypothesis Set 3 takes a somewhat different 
approach, comparing the emotion and responsibility attribu-
tions of actors to the emotion and responsibility attribu-
tions of observers. It has been previously shown that one 
way to test the effect of self system motivation on attri-
butions of actors and observers is to directly compare the 
emotions and responsibility attributions of one group of 
actors (or observers) with another group of actors (or ob-
servers). A second method is to compare emotions andre-
sponsibility attributions of sets of actors and observers. 
Hypothesis Sets 3 and 4 make these comparisons, with the 
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intent of obtaining additional information from a different 
perspective in the data. It should be mentioned that these 
comparlsons are not orthogonal to, but overlapping, those 
of Hypothesis Sets 1 and 2. 
Research indicates that actors who have successful out-
comes feel good about those outcomes (Finney, Helm, & Fromme, 
Note 1) and attribute as much personal responsibility for 
those outcomes as do observers (Beckman, 1970; Finney, Helm, 
& Fromme, Note 1). The social facilitation data from Henchy 
and Glass (1968) suggests that being observed by a friend 
increases arousal, and the present self system model sug~ 
gests that this arousal heightens one's good feelings about 
success and motivation to attribute personal responsibility 
for the outcome (Hypothesis Set l)c The present conception 
of the self system also suggests that observers who are 
friends of actors become like actors in their emotions and 
attributions, as friends' outcomes are relevant to observersr 
self systems (Hypothesis Set 2). Therefore, for successful 
outcomes observers in friendship dyads should feel as good, 
and attribute as much personal responsibility, as do actors 
ln friendship dyads. 
Actors in stranger dyads should also feel similar~ and 
attribute as much personal responsibility, as do observers 
in stranger dyads. Also, since self system arousal is lower 
for both actors and strangers who obserVe them than for ac-
tors and friends who observe them, the above contentions 
(Emotion and Responsibility Hypotheses 3a and 3b), in effect, 
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predict that social facilitation effects cause more intense 
emotions to be felt, and more personal responsibility to 
be attributed to the actor, in successful friendship dyads 
than in successful stranger dyads. This proposition can be 
tested as a corollary to Responsibility and Emotion Hypo-
theses 3a and 3b. 
Emotion Hypothesis 3a: No significant difference in 
emotion will be felt between successful actors and 
their observers in friendship dyads. 
Responsibility Hypothesis 3a: No significant differ-
ence in personal responsibility attributions will 
occur between successful actors and their observers 
in friendship dyads. 
Emotion Hypothesis 3b: No significant difference 1n 
emotion will be felt between successful actors and 
their observers in stranger dyads. 
Responsibility Hypothesis 3b: No significant differ-
ence in personal responsibility attributions will 
occur between successful actors and their observers 
in stranger dyads. 
Emotion Corollary 1: Better feelings about a success-
ful outcome will be attributed in friendship dyads 
than in stranger dyads. 
Responsibility Corollary 1: More personal responsi-
bility will be attributed for successful outcomes 
in friendship dyads than in stranger dyads. 
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Emotion and Responsibility Hypotheses 3a would each. be 
supported by nonsignificant comparisons between levels of 
C at A1B1D1 of the emotion and responsibility attributions, 
respectively. Emotion and Responsibility Hypotheses 3b 
would each be supported by nonsignificant comparisons be-
tween levels of C at A1 B2D1 of the emotion and r?sponsibil-
ity attributions~ re~pebtively. Emotion and Responsibility 
Corollaries 1 would each be supported by a significant 
comparison between levels of B at A1D1 of the emotion and 
responsibility attributions, respectively. 
Hypothesis Set 4 
Previous research (Finney, Merrifield, & Helm, 1976) 
and the present conception of the self system suggests that 
actors feel bad about unsuccessful outcomes and attribute 
impersonal, environmental responsibility for such outcomes. 
Stranger observers do not share these bad feelings and, as 
with successful outcomes, attribute personal responsibility 
for unsuccessful outcomes. Therefore, in the present exper~ 
iment unsuccessful actors should feel worse~ and attribute 
less personal responsibility, than do the strangers who 
observe them. 
Within friendship dyads, however, defensiveness on the 
part of observers (Shaver, 1970), resulting from feelings 
of similarity or the bonds shared with actors (Fromme, Note 
7), should cause observers to feel as bad about unsuccessful 
outcomes for fr~ends as the friends do. Like the unsuccess~ 
ful actors, friends should attribute impersonal responsi-
bility for the outcomes. 
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Emotion Hypothesis 4a: No significant difference will 
exist in feelings about an unsuccessful outcome be~ 
tween actors and their observers in friendship dyadso 
Responsibility Hypothesis 4a: No significant differ~ 
ence will exist between the responsibility attribu~ 
tions of unsuccessful actors and their observers 
in friendship dyads" 
Emotion Hypothesis 4b: Unsuccessful actors in stranger 
dyads will feel worse about their outcomes than will 
the strangers who observed them" 
Responsibility Hypothesis 4b: Unsuccessful actors in 
stranger dyads will attribute less personal respon-
sibility for their outcomes than will their obser~ 
vers. 
Emotion and Responsibility Hypotheses 4a predict a non-
significant comparison between levels of C at A2B1D1 in the 
emotion and responsibility attributions, respectivelyo 
Emo:tion; and • Responsibility Hypotheses 4b predict a signifi-
cant comparison between levels of C at A2B2D1 in the emotion 
and responsibility attributions, respectivelyo 
Hypothesis Set. 5 
Hypothesis Set 5 begins a survey of another set of 
ratings by subjects in the present experiment--attributions 
concerning the outcome of the actor in the opposing dyado 
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As noted ln the discussion of arguments presented by Fromme 
(Note 7) and Miller and Norman (in press) concerning the 
attributions of actors and observers in competitive situa-
tions, attributions about an opponent's outcome also seem 
to serve one's self system" It has already been shown that 
an ac~or both feels good and attributes personal responsi-
bility for his successful outcomes, and both feels bad and 
attributes less personal responsibility for his unsuccessful 
outcomes, as means by which he enhances or protects his self 
system" Yet, actors should also feel bad about an opponent~s 
successful outcomes and attribute impersonal responsibility 
to the opponent for those outcomes, implying that both his 
own failure and the opponent's success were circumstantially 
caused. Actors should also feel good about an opponent's 
unsuccessful outcomes and attribute personal responsibility 
for those outcomes, implying that his own superior ability 
relative to the opponent caused both outcomes. These attri-
butions, too, would serve to enhance or protect an actor's 
self system" 
Emotion Hypothesis 5: Actors will feel better about 
an opponent's unsuccessful outcome than they will 
feel about an opponent's successful outcome" 
Responsibility Hypothesis 5: Actors will attribute 
more personal responsibility to an opponent for 
the opponent's unsuccessful outcome than they will 
for his successful outcome" 
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Also, the social facilitation argument of increased 
drive for anticipated evaluation should be reflected in 
feelings and vesponsibility attributions concerning an 
opponent's outcomeo The actor in a friendship dyad should 
feel better about. the outcome of an unsuccessful opponent 
than should the actor in a stranger dyado Therefpre, actors 
in friendship dyads should attribute more personal responsi-
bility to an opponent for the opponent's unsuccessful out-
come than phould actors ~n stranger dyadso ,The actor ln 
a friendship dyad should feel worse about the outcome of a 
successful opponent than should the actor ln a stranger 
dyado Therefore, actors in friendship dyads should attri~ 
bute less personal responsibility (more impersonal respon-
sibility) to an opponent for the opponent's successful out-
come than should actors in stranger dyadso 
Emotion Hypothesis Sa~ Actors who are observed by 
friends will feel better about an opponent's unsuc-
cessful outcome than will actors who are observed 
by strangers. 
Responsibility Hypothesis Sa: Actors who are observed 
by friends will attribute more personal responsi-
bility to an opponent for the opponent's unsuccess-
ful outcome than will actors who are observed by 
strangers. 
Emotion Hypothesis 5b: Actors who are observed by 
friends will feel worse about an opponent's success-
ful outcome than will actors who are observed by 
strangers. 
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Responsibility Hypothesis Sb: Actors who are observed 
by friends will attribute less personal responsi-
bility to an opponent for the opponent's successful 
outcome than will actors who are observed by , 
strangers. 
Emotion and Responsibility Hypotheses 5 would each be 
supported by a significant comparison between levels of A 
at c1n2 of the emotion and responsibility attributions, 
respectively. Emotion and Responsibility Hypotheses Sa 
would each be supported by a significant comparison between 
levels of B at A1c1n2 of the emotion and responsibility 
attributions, respectively. Emotion and Responsibility 
Hypotheses Sb would each be supported by a significant com-
parison between levels of B at A2C1D2 of the emotion and 
responsibility attributions, respectively. 
It should be noted that the successful outcome of an 
actor (or observer of a successful actor), level A1 , implies 
the unsuccessful outcome of the opponent. Therefore, when 
ratings are to be analyzed about an outcome of an opponent, 
these ratings would be found under the opposite outcome, 
the actual outcome of the act6r"(or observer) making the 
rating. That is, to look at attributions about an opponent 
who loses, one must look at the attributions ofLan.actor 
who succeeds. 
Hypothesis Set 6 
The present self system conception and Fromme (Note 7) 
have proposed that an observer who is a friend of an actor 
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involved in a competitive situation.shares mutual feelings 
and attributions with the actor, in effect making the actor's 
outcome his own. Such a relationship is also proposed to 
increase the observer's defensiveness (Shaver, 1970) and 
empathy (Regan g Totten, 1975). Present self system vlews, 
however, have extended this logic farther than preseltly 
considered by defensive or empathy hypotheses. It lS pro-
posed that observers who are friends of the actors whom they 
are observing will feel worse about an opponent's success 
and attribute that outcome more to impersonal responsibility 
than wilL.observers who are strangers of the actors they are 
observing. Also, friends of actors will feel better about 
an opponent's failure and attribute that outcome more to 
personal responsibility than will 'observers who are stran-· 
gers of the actors they are observing. 
Emotion Hypothesis 6a: Observers who have watched 
friends have successful outcomes will express better 
feelings about an opponent's unsuccessful outcome 
than will observers who have watched strangers have 
successful outcomes. 
Responsibility Hypothesis 6a: Observers who have 
watched friends have successful outcomes will attri-
bute an opponent's unsuccessful outcome more to the 
opponent's personal responsibility than will obser-
vers who have watched strangers have successful 
outcomes. 
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Emotion Hypothesis 6b: Observers who have watched 
friends have unsuccessful outcomes:will feel worse 
about an opponent's successful outcome than will 
observers who have watched strangers have unsuccess-
ful outcomes. 
Responsibility Hypothesis 6b: Observers who have 
watched friends have unsuccessful outcomes will 
attribute an opponent's suc'cessful outcome less to 
the personal responsibility of the opponent than 
will observers who have watched strangers have un-
successful outcomes. 
Emotion and Responsibility Hypotheses Sa would each be 
supported by a significant comparison between levels of B at 
A1 C2D2 for the emotion and responsibility attributions, re-
spectively. Emotion and Responsibility Hypotheses Sb would 
each be supported by a significant comparison between levels 
of B at A2c2D2 for the emotion and responsibility attribu-
tions, respectively. 
Hypothesis Set 7 
Hypothesis Sets 5 and 6 concerned emotions and respon-
sibility attributions for an opponent's outcome from actors' 
and observers' viewpoints, respectively. Hypothesis Sets 7 
and 8 compare actor and observer attributions for successful 
and unsuccessful outcomes of an opposing player. Again, 
Hypothesis Sets 7 and 8 are not orthogonal to Hypothesis 
Sets 5 and 6, but information concerning various relation-
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ships in the data may be gained from these analyses and 
their results. t 
Miller and Norman (in press) argued that an actor's 
behavior is more hedonically relevant and personalistic to 
active observers than to passive observers. Therefore, ac-
tive observers should make greater personal responsibility 
attributions about the causes of another's behavior and out-
comes than should passive observers. The present argument, 
however, has established that hedonic relevance and person-
alism give rise to self system def~nsiveness, an attribu-
tional adjustment which is designed to either protect or 
enhance the self system of the attributor. If self system 
protection would result from attributing another person's 
behavior and outcomes to the personal responsibility of the 
person, then such an attribution would be made. But, if 
enhancement or protection of the self system would be affor-
ded by attributing responsibility away from the other person 
and toward his circumstances, then that attribution would 
be made. In the specific case of a successful outcome for 
an opponent, the actor (active observer) should feel worse 
and attribute less personal responsibility to the opponent 
for that .outcome than should a stranger who observed the 
interaction (passive observer). For the actor to feel good 
about an opponent's successful outcome and attribute person-
al responsibility for it would be an admission that the 
opponent had greater ability than the self, a deprecating 
and unlikely attribution. 
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However, it has been hypothesized that observers who 
are friends of actors express emotions and attribute re-
sponsibility more like the actors than like observers who 
are strangers of actors. Thus, observers who are friends 
of the actors they observed should feel as bad about an 
opponent's successful outcome and attribute the same level 
of personal responsibility for it as the actors do. In 
M~ller and Norman's (in press) terms, passive observers who 
are friends of actors should become like active observers 
ln their attributions about opponents' outcomes. 
Emotion Hypothesis 7a: Actors and observers ln friend-
ship dyads will not express significantly different 
emotions about an opponent's successful outcome. 
Responsibility Hypothesis 7a: Actors and observers 
in friendship dyads will not attribute signifi-
cantly different responsibility to an opponent for 
the opponent's successful outcome. 
Emotion Hypothesis 7b: Actors~in stranger dyads will 
feel worse about an opponent's successful outcome 
than will observers ln stranger dyads. 
·Resp6nsibility Hypoth~~is 7b: Acto~S in str~nge~ 
'dyads will attribute less pkrso:r\al~ responsibility 
tq an opponent for the opponent 1 s sficb~~sful out-
come than will observers in Strange~-dyads. 
Emotion and Responsibility H~poth~ses 7a would each 
be supported by a nonsignificant comparison between levels 
of- G at A2B1_D 2,- of thee emotion and-responsibility attribu-
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tions, respectively. Emotion and Responsibility Hypotheses 
7b would each be supported by a significant comparison be-
tween levels of C at A2B2D2 of the emotion and responsibility 
attributions, respectively. 
Hypothesis Set 8 
Just as successful outcomes of opponents have ego-
relevant implications for actors and their friends (Hypo-
thesis Set 7), unsuccessful outcomes for opponents should 
have implications for their self systems. According to the 
present self system model, actors and observers in friend-
ship dyads should feel the same about an opponent's unsuc-
cessful outcome and attribute equal responsibility to the 
opponent for it. Calling the opponent personally responsi~ 
ble for his loss is a way to indicate that the opponent had 
less ability in the competition than did the self (or 
friend). Such an attribution would seem to maximally separ-
ate characteristics of the winning self (or friend) from the 
losing opponent, as personal responsibility attributions for 
one's own success indicates that one's own ability and 
effort produced the successful outcome. 
Actors in stranger dyads should also express this same 
self system enhancing tendency of feeling good about an 
opponent's unsuccessful outcome and attributing personal 
responsibility to the opponent for it. Yet, because of the 
social facilitation concepts which suggest that greater self 
system motivation occurs in friendship dyads than in stran-
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ger dyads, this tendency should be less for actors in stran-
ger dyads than it would be for actors in friendship dyads 
(Emotion and Responsibility Hypotheses Sa). Emotion and 
Responsibility Hypotheses 6a also predicted this same ten-
dency for observers, as observers in friendship dyads should 
feel better about an opponent's failure and attribute more 
personal responsibility to an opponent for it than should 
an observer in a stranger dyad. It then follows that actors 
and observers in either friendship or stranger dyads would 
feel similar about an opponent's failure and attribute equal 
responsibility for it, and that these emotions and attribu~ 
tions in friendship dyads would be greater than those in 
stranger dyads. 
Emotion Hypothesis 8a: No significant difference in 
emotions about an opponent~s unsuccessful outcome 
will be felt between actors and observers in friend-
ship dyads. 
Responsibility Hypothesis 8a: No significant differ-
ence in personal responsibility attributed to an 
opponent for an-opponent's unsuccessful outcome will 
occur between actors and observers in friendship 
dyads. 
Emotion Hypothesis 8b: No significant difference in 
emotions about an opponent's unsuccessful outcome 
will be felt between actors and observers ln stran~ 
ger dyads. 
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Responsibility Hypothesis 8b: No significant difference 
in personal responsibility attributed to an opponent 
for the opponent's unsuccessful outcome will occur 
between actors and observers in stranger dyads. 
Emotion Corollary 2: Better feelings about an oppo-
nent's unsuccessful outcome will be felt in friend= 
ship than in: stranger dyads. 
Responsibility Corollary 2: More personal responsibil-
ity will be attributed to an opponent for the oppo-
nent's unsuccessful outcome in friendship than in 
stranger dyads. 
Emotion and Responsibility Hypotheses 8a would each be 
supported by a non-significant comparison between levels of 
C at A1B1D2 of the emotion and responsibility attributions, 
respectively. Emotion and Responsibility Hypotheses 8b 
would each be supported by non-significant comparisons be-
tween levels of C at A1B2D2 of the emotion and responsibility 
attributions, respectively. Emotion and Responsibility 
Corollaries 2 would each be supported by a significant com-
parison between levels of B at A1D2 of the emotion and re-
sponsibility attributions, respectively. 
Summary 
The mass of hypotheses presented 1n this chapter should 
be conceptualized, or visualized, for the reader. Possibly 
the best way to summarize these hypotheses would be in a 
diagram which would show general responsibility attributions 
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(personal or environmental/impersonal) and emotions (good or 
bad) anticipated for each actor (successful or unsuccessful) 
or observer (friend or stranger). Such a diagram is repre-
sented in Table I. Degrees of attribution, such as those 
predicted in hypotheses dealing with social facilitation 
effects (e.g., a somewhat personal responsibility attribu-
tion versus a very personal responsibility attribution), 
cannot be distinguished within this figure. Nevertheless, 
the expression of the general anticipated attributions of 
subjects might be helpful in conceptualizing these hypothe-
ses. 
To interpret this diagram, for example, the "X's" in 
the first line for "actor-friend" indicates that actors in 
friendship dyads should attribute personal responsibility 
for success, environmental responsibility for failure, 
feel good about success, and feel bad about failure. 
TABLE I 
A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE HYPOTHESES 
Attribution Emotion 
Attributor-Dyad Success Failure Success Failure 
(Attributee) Person Environ. Person Environ. Good Bad Good Bad 
Actor-Friend 
(Self) X X X X 
Actor-Stranger 
(Self) X X X X 
Actor-Friend 
(Opponent) X X X X 
Actor-Stranger 
(Opponent) X X X X 
Observer-Friend 
(Actor) X X X X 
Observer-Stranger· 
(Actor) X X X ':I': X ':I': 
Observer-Friend 
(Opponent) X X X X 
Observer-Stranger 
(Opponent) X X x··· x~': .. 
(J) 
-..J 




Eighty male subjects from various psychology classes at 
Oklahoma State University participated in this experiment. 
Twenty sessions involving four subjects per session were 
scheduled. For ten sessions four subjects were signed up 
individually (Stranger condition of the Dyad variable). For 
the other ten sessions two individuals signed up, and each 
was required to bring a friend to the experiment (Friend 
condition of the Dyad variable). 
Apparatus 
Pre-interaction 
Random assignment of subjects to roles in the experi~ 
ment was done by random drawing of slips of paper from a can. 
On each slip of paper was written one of the four roles ln 
the experiment--Player at Unit 1 (Al); Player at Unit 2 (A2); 
Observer at Unit 1 (01); and Observer at Unit 2 (02). For 
the Stranger condition all four slips of paper were inserted 
into the can prior to the experiment. For the Friend condi= 
tion two slips of paper (Al and 01) were first placed into 
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the can. After one friendship pa1r had drawn these slips of 
paper, the other two slips of paper (A2 and 02) were inserted 
into the can for drawing by the other friendship pair. This 
variation was designed to ensure that each friendship pair 
remained an actor-observer unit. 
A pre-interaction booklet of rating scales was also pre~ 
pared for each subject to complete in the waiting room. 
Three pages contained identical, 9-point rating scales asking 
the subject to report the degree of acquaintance between him-
self and another person from "I do not know this person at 
alL" to "I am well acquainted with this person." Space was 
also provided above this scale for the subject to fill in his 
own initials and the initials of the person he was rating. 
Interaction 
A message-modified, non-zero sum Prisoner 1 s Dilemma 
Game (PDG) was used for the competitive interaction in this 
experiment. In this particular PDG, players could either 
press a button for "Choice 1" or for "Choice 2" each time a 
green "GO" light lit on his unit. The potential payoffs for 
choice combinations included: 1) +4 points for both players, 
if both made Choice 1; 2 & 3) +5 points for the player who 
made Choice 2 and -5 points for the player who made Choice 1~ 
if one player made Choice 1 and the other player made Choice 
2; and 4) -4 points for both players, if both players made 
Choice 2. 
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Each PDG unit included four messages which each player 
could send to the other. These messages read: 1) I will 
make Choice 1; 2) You make Choice 1; 3) Let's both make 
Choice 1; and 4) I do: not wish to disclose my intentions. 
Players could send any message by pressing a button next to 
it. A light would then be lit on the other player's unit, 
showing to him the message which was sent. 
The messages did not have any direct bearing on the 
outcome of a session, but simply allowed actors to attempt 
to influence each other's choices. These messages made it 
appear to subjects that strategy and skill was a part of the 
game, thus enabling subjects to attribute personal responsi-
bility for outcomes. The interaction was not influenced by 
the experimenter, and outcomes were entirely a product of 
the interaction. 
A record of this interaction was kept by the experi-
menter. Entries for messages sent, points obtained, and 
total score were kept for each trial. 
Post-interaction 
Two rating booklets for the outcome of the interaction 
were prepared for each subject. On one booklet the subject 
was to rate one of the players in the PDG interaction on all 
scales; on· the other booklet he was to rate the other player. 
As a check on the manipulation of the Outcome variable, sub-
jects were asked to assess on 9-point rating scales the 
"Very Unsuccessful" to "Very Successful" outcome of the 
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interaction for the player being rated. Next, they assessed 
"The Circumstances" to "The Person" responsibility for the 
outcome of that pl~ay-er ., Finally, subjects rated their 
"Very-·Good" to 11 Very Bad" feelings about the outcome of the 
player being rated. 
The booklets were blocked so that half of the subjects 
rated the within-dyad actor's outcome before the opponent's 
outcome; the other half of the subjects rated· the opponent 
before the within-dyad actor. These scales have been used 
by Whiteside (Note 3) and by Finney, Helm, and Fromme (Note 
1), and have proved to be adequate measures of responsibility 
and emotion attributions. 
Procedure 
After the subjects had arrived ln the waiting room, 
they were given a brief description of the experiment. Then 
each subject was handed a Pre-interaction booklet. On each 
of the three pages each subject rated how well he knew one 
of the other three participants in the experiment. If two 
subjects in the Stranger condition rated their acquaintance 
at "S" or above on this 9-point scale, they were automatic-
ally assigned to observer roles. Hence, they neither obser-
ved nor· rated each other 1 s behavior. The other two subjects 
were then assigned to player roles. Observers then randomly 
drew for the unit at which they would be observing, and 
players drew for the unit at which they would be playing. 
(Roles were assigned in this manner in only two sessions)" 
Otherwise, the four subjects next randomly drew for their 
roles from the four potential roles. 
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If a subject indicated an acquaintance at 11 5 11 or above 
1n the Friendship condition for one of the participants 
other than the friend who accompanied him to the lab, the 
session was stopped (without the subjects' knowledge), and 
an alternative experiment was presented to them. (This 
event occurred only once). Otherwise, within each friend-
ship pair the observer and player roles were randomly drawn. 
Subjects were then taken to the PDG room and given ful~ 
instructions about the play of the game (Appendix A). Fol-
lowing these instructions the players participated in four 
practive trials. The players~ choices during these trials 
were directed by the experimenter so that each of the four 
possible matrix outcomes was demonstrated. Next, the sub-
jects were shown how messages were sent and received. Fol-
lowing any questions, the game began and proceeded for 
twenty trials. In case of a tied score after twenty trials, 
the game continued until one player had obtained the lead. 
(This event ·occurred in two sessions). 
Opportunities to send messages were g1ven to each 
player before each game trial. The player to send the first 
message was alternated after each trial. Thus, each player 
sent the first message ten times, and he sent the second 
message ten times. 
At the conclusion of the PDG interaction the experl-
menter announced the winner and the loser of the interaction. 
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Then each player was handed the Post-interaction rating 
booklets, upon which he rated responsibility for, and feel-
ings about, the outcome of the interaction. Each subject 
had two such booklets--one for rating the winning player, 
and the other for rating the losing player. With the ex-
ception of slight wording changes in the questions appro-
priate for the ~iewpoint of the subject making the rating 
(e.g., "What was the outcome of the player you observed in 
the strategy game?" versus "What was your outcome in the 
strategy game?"), all booklets were identical. 
Upon completion of these ratings, subjects were de-
briefed. They were told the purpose of the experiment and 
some of the predictions which had been made. After ques-




A Note on Statistics 
All hypotheses were tested by ~priori !-tests (1-· 
tailed). Since the use of~ priori comparisons obviates the 
necessity for an overall analysis of variance CANOVA; Kirk, 
1968), the summary ANOVAs for responsibility and em6tion 
attributions will not be discussed in this section. However, 
these ANOVAs may be found in Appendices B and C, respective-
ly. It should be mentioned that the significance levels of 
the t~rms 1n these analyses are not indicative of the sig-
nificance 1n the data, because within these ANOVAs a partic-
ular actor or observer rated both his own outcome (or the 
outcome of the player he observed) and the opposite outcome 
of the opponent. Both of these outcomes were classified 
under the outcome of the actor making the attribution, or--
ln the case of the observer--the actor being observed. That 
1s (for example), an actor who was successful would be 
placed into the Outcome category, A1 , and his self-. 
attributions would be categorized, A1 CB 1 or 2 )C 1D1 . His 
attribution about his opponent's outcome would be categor-
ized, A1 CB 1 or 2 ) C1D2 . Notice, however, that the opponent 
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has an unsuccessful outcome, but this outcome is still clas-
sified under A1 , the successful outcome, because that was 
the outcome of the actor making the attributions. That both 
successful and unsuccessful outcomes are included in the 
successful and unsuccessful levels of the Outcome variable 
makes the responsibility and emotion ANOVAs meaningless as 
tests for main effects and interactions across the Ratee 
variable. These ANOVAs are still important, however, as 
the within and between-subjects error variances which are 
computed in them are accurate, and can be used in the tests 
of specific hypotheses for this experiment. The tests of 
hypotheses were not hindered by this problem, as all tests 
were at either one level or the other of the Ratee variable, 
thus dealing with one player in a competing pair at a time. 
All cell means for emotion and responsibility attribu-
tions may be found in Appendices D and E, respectively. 
Means relevant to each Hypothesis Set will also be presented 
in the text as appropriate. Within these tables, larger 
numbers for responsibility attributions represent greater 
attributed personal responsibility for an outcome, and lar-
ger numbers for emotion attributions represent better feel-
ings about an outcome. 
Each of the following hypothesis sets involve two or 
three orthogonal comparisons between means in both the 
emotion and responsibility attributions, rather than a sin-
gle comparison. Comparisons between hypothesis sets, how-
ever, are sometimes not orthogonal. Because multiple com-
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par1sons were made and some comparisons were not orthogonal, 
an attempt to preserve the error rat;e per hypothesis set was 
made by using conservative degrees of freedom. For hypo-
t;heses p~edicting significant differences between means, 
rather than us1ng the degrees of freedom for error terms 1n 
the summary analyses of variance, as 1s th standard proced-
ure (Kirk, 1968), the actual degrees of freedom involved in 
individual compar1sons were used to evaluate t-ratios. In 
most cases this reduced the degrees of freedom from 72 to 
18, as each cell in the design included the data from ten 
subjects. This procedure decreased the likelihood of Type 
I errors, and increased the likelihood of Type II errors, 
and therefore is conservative. 
For hypotheses predicting no significant differences 
between means, conservatism involved the use of "liberal" 
statistical tests. Therefore, for "no difference" hypothe-
ses the degrees of freedom from the error terms for the 
pr1mary emotion and responsibility attribution ANOVAs were 
used. Thic procedure increased the likelihood of a Type I 
error, and therefore i~ conservative for hypotheses predic-
ting no significant difference between means. 
Finally, the MS values used to create the error error 
terms used in the t-ratios were derived by pooling the 
between-subjects error term and the within-subjects error 
term of the summary ANOVAs for responsibility and emotion 
attributions (Kirk, 1968). Pooling of these terms was done 
because each of the interactions on which all comparisons 
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are based (either ACD or ABCD) involved a repeated measure 
factor (D), but all comparisons involved only factorial var-
iables at one level of D or the other. Thus, pooling of the 
ANOVA error terms for comparison er'ror terms was appropriate. 
The Results 
Manipulation Check 
The check on the success-failure manipulation found 
that wins (M = 8.90) were perceived as more successful than 
were losses (M = 2.70), !_, (70) = 24.80, :e_<.001. These 
ratings were only analyzed for the outcome of the within-
dyad actor, and not for the outcomes of the opponents. Also, 
no difference was found between actors and observers on 
perceptions of the success of an outcome. 
Hypothesis Set 1 
Emotion Hypothesis 1, which predicted that actors who 
had successful outcbmes would feel·bette~ ~bout their out-
comes (M = 9.10) than would actors who·had unsuccessful out-
comes (M = 4.85)~ was ~upported~.t (38) = 10~a7, :e_~.Ol. 
Responsibility Hypothesis 1, which predicted that more per-
sonal responsibility would be attributed by actors who had 
successful outcomes (~ = 7.15) than by actors who had unsuc-
cessful outcomes (M = 5.20), was also supported, t (38) = 
3.05, :e_<.Ol. 
Emotion Hypothesis la, which predicted that successful 
actors who were observed by friends would feel better about 
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their outcomes (M = 9o50) than would actors who were obser-
ved by strangers (~ = 8o70), was not significantly suppor-
ted, ! (18) = lo38o However, Responsibility Hypothesis la, 
which predicted that more personal responsibility would be 
attributed by successful actors who were observed by friends 
(M = 8ol0) than by successful actors who were~observed 
by strangers (M = 6o20), was supported, t (18) = 2oll, E.< o05o 
TABLE II 
MEANS FOR ACTOR ATTRIBUTIONS ABOUT THEIR 
OWN OUTCOMES (HYPOTHESIS SET 1) 
Outcome 
Attribution Dyad Successful Unsuccessful 
Friendship 9 0 50 4o60 
Emotion· Stranger 8o70 5o10 
M 9o10 4o95 
Friendship 8o10 50 7 0 
Stranger 6 0 20 4o70 
Responsibility 
M 7o15 50 2 0 
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Finally, Emotion Hypothesis lb, which predicted that 
unsuccessful actors who were observed by friends would feel 
worse about their outcomes (M = 4.60) than would unsuccess-
ful actors who were observed by strangers (M = 5.10), was 
not supported, t (18) = .86. Responsibility Hypothesis lb, 
which predicted that unsuccessful actors who were observed 
by friends would attribute less personal responsibility 
(M = 5.70) than would unsuccessful actors who were observed 
by strangers (M = 4.70), was not supported, t (18) = 1.11. 
Emotion 
TABLE III 
COMPARISONS FOR ACTOR ATTRIBUTIONS ABOUT 
THEIR OWN OUTCOMES (HYPOTHESIS SET 1) 
Hypothesis df error t 
Hypothesis 1 38 .41 10.37 
Hypothesis la 18 • 58 L38 
Hypothesis lb 18 .58 . 8 6 
Hypothesis 1 38 .64 3.05 
Responsibility Hypothesis la 18 . 9 0 2.11 




. 0 5 
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A statistical summary of the means and comparlsons in 
Hypothesis Set 1 can be found in Tables II and III, respec-
tively. To summarize these results, successful actors, in 
general, both attributed more responsibility about their 
outcomes to themselves, and felt better about their outcomes, 
than did unsuccessful actors. These results supported the 
general self system theory proposed for actors. However, 
the modifications suggested by social facilitation theory 
were not so strongly supported. Successful actors who were 
observed by friends attributed more responsibility for their 
outcomes to themselves, but felt little better about those 
outcomes than did successful actors who were observed by 
strangers. Finally, no difference was found between unsuc-
cessful actors who were observed by friends or strangers in 
responsibility or emotion attributions about their outcomes. 
Hypothesis Set 2 
Emotion Hypothesis 2a, which predicted that friends of 
actors who had successful outcomes would feel better about 
those outcomes (M = 9.30) than would strangers who observed 
successful outcomes (M = 8.20), was supported, t (18) = 
1.90, £_(.05. Responsibility Hypothesis 2a, which predicted 
that friends of actors who had successful outcomes would 
attribute more personal responsibility for those outcomes 
(M = 7.10) than would strangers who observed actors with 
successful outcomes (M = 5.50), was also supported, t (18) ~ 
1.77, £<.05. 
TABLE IV 
MEANS FOR OBSERVER ATTRIBUTIONS FOR OUTCOMES 
OF ACTORS THEY OBSERVED (HYPOTHESIS SET 2) 
Dyad 
Attribution Outcome Friendship Stranger 
Successful 9.30 8. 2 0 
Emotion 
Unsuccessful 4.50 5.50 
Successful 7.10 5. 50 
Responsibility 
Unsuccessful 5. 2 0 8 .• 6 0 
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Emotion Hypothesis 2b, which predicted that friends of 
actors who had unsuccessful outcomes would feel worse about 
those outcomes (M = 4.50) than would strangers who observed 
unsuccessful outcomes (~ = 5.50), was supported,! (18) = 
1.73, £<.05. Responsibility Hypothesis 2b, which predicted 
that friends of actors who had unsuccessful outcomes would 
attribute less personal responsibility for those outcomes 
(M = 5.20) than would strangers who observed actors with 
unsuccessful outcomes (M = 8.60), was also supported, 
t (18) = 3.78, E.< .01. 
A statistical summary of means and comparisons 1n Hypo-
thesis Set 2 can be found in Tables IV and V. Within Hypo-
thesis Set 2 predictions concerning responsibility and 
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emotion attributions of friends versus strangers in observer 
roles were strongly supported. It was found that friends 
of successful actors attributed more responsibility to the 
actors for their outcomes, and felt better about their out-
comes, than did strangers. Also, friends of unsuccessful 
actors attributed less responsibility to the actors for 
their outcomes, and felt worse about their outcomes, than 
did strangers. 
TABLE V 
COMPARISONS FOR OBSERVER ATTRIBUTIONS FOR OUTCOMES 
OF ACTORS THEY OBSERVED (HYPOTHESIS SET 2) 
Hypothesis df error t 
Hypothesis 2a 18 . 58 1. 9 0 
Emotion 
Hypothesis 2b 18 .58 1. 7 3 
Hypothesis 2a 18 . 9 0 1. 77 
Responsibility 
Hypothesis 2b 18 . 9 0 3.78 
Hypothesis Set 3 
p 
. 0 5 
. 0 5 
. 0 5 
. 01 
Emotion Hypothesis 3a, which predicted that no signif-
icant difference in emotions would be attributed for a sue-
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cessful outcome between actors (M = 9.50) and observers 
(~ = 9.30) in friendship dyads was supported~ t (72) = .35. 
Responsibility Hypothesis 3a~ which predicted that no sig-
nificant difference in responsibility would be attributed 
for a successful outcome between actors (M = 8.10) and ob-
servers (M = 7.10) in friendship dyads~ was also supported~ 
t (12) = 1.11. 
TABLE VI 
MEANS FOR ACTOR VERSUS OBSERVER ATTRIBUTIONS 
FOR ACTOR'S SUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES 
(HYPOTHESIS SET 3) 
Viewpoint 
Attribution Dyad Actor Observer 
Friendship 9.50 9 0 3 0 
Emotion 
Stranger 8.70 8.20 
Friendship 8.10 7.10 
Responsibility 






Emotion Hypothesis 3b~ which predicted that no signif-
icant difference in emotions would be attributed for a sue-
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cessful outcome between actors (M = 8.70) and observers 
(M = 8.20) in stranger dyads, was supported, t (72) = .86. 
Responsibility Hypothesis 3b, which predicted that no signif-
icant difference in responsibility would be attributed for 
a successful outcome between actors (M = 6.20) and observers 
(M = 5.50) in successful stranger dyads, was also supported, 
t (7 2 ) = 0 7 8 0 
TABLE VII 
COMPARISONS FOR ACTOR VERSUS OBSERVER ATTRIBUTIONS 
FOR ACTOR'S SUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES (HYPOTHESIS SET 3) 
Hypothesis df error t 
Hypothesis 3a~t; 72 .58 0 3 5 
Emotion Hypothesis 3b~': 72 .58 0 8 6 
Corollary 1 ::38 .41 2.63 
Hypothesis 3a ~·: 72 0 90 1.11 
Responsibility Hypothesis 3b~': 72 0 90 0 7 8 
Corollary l 38 0 63 2 0 7 8 
'~~ Denotes hypotheses which predicted nonsignificant 
differences. 
p 
. 0 5 
.01 
Finally, Emotion Corollary 1, which predicted better 
feelings about successful outcomes in friendship dyads 
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(M = 9.40) than in successful stranger dyads (~ = 8.45), was 
supported, ! (38) = 2.63, £< .01. Responsibility Corollary 
1, which predicted that more personal responsibility would 
be attriouted in successful friendship dyads (M = 7.60) than 
ln successful stranger dyads (M = 5.85), was also supported, 
t (38) = 2.78, £(.01. 
A statistical summary of means and comparisons in Hypo-
thesis Set 3 can be found in Tables VI and VII. All results 
within Hypothesis Set 3 are consistent with predictions 
based on consideration of self system and social facilita~ 
tion influences over attributions. It was fo~nd that friend-
ship dyads attribute more personal responsibility to the 
dyad~s actor for a successful outcome, and feel better about 
the outcome, than do stranger dyads. Within friendship and 
stranger dyads, no difference was found between the dyad's 
actor and observer in attributions of responsibility or 
emotion about the actor's outcome. 
Hypothesis Set 4 
The prediction that unsuccessful actors (M = 4.60) and 
their friends (M = 4.50) would not have significantly dif-
ferent bad feelings about the actor's outcome (Emotion Hypo-
thesis 4a) was supported, ! (72.) = .17. Responsibility 
Hypothesis 4a, which predicted that no significant differ-
ence in responsibility would be attributed between unsuccess-
ful actors (M = 5.70) and their observers (M = 5.20) in 
friendship dyads, was also supported, t (72) = .56. 
TABLE VIII 
MEANS FOR ACTOR VERSUS OBSERVER ATTRIBUTIONS FOR 
ACTOR'S UNSUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES (HYPOTHESIS SET 4) 
Viewpoint 
Attribution Dyad Actor Observer 
Friendship 4.60 4.50 
Emotion 
Stranger 5.10 5.50 
Friendship 5.70 5. 2 0 
Responsibility 
Stranger 4.70 8. 6 0 
The prediction that actors in unsuccessful stranger 
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dyads would feel worse a~out their outcomes (M = 5.10) than 
would their stranger observers (~ = 5.50), was not supported 
(Emotion Hypothesis 4b), ! (18) = .69. Responsibility Hypo-
thesis 4b, which predicted that unsuccessful actors in 
stranger dyads would attribute less personal responsibility 
for their outcomes (M = 4.70) than would their stranger ob-
servers (M = 8.60), was supported, t (18) = 4.33, E_<.Ol. 
TABLE IX 
COMPARISONS FOR ACTOR VERSUS OBSERVER ATTRIBUTIONS FOR 
ACTOR'S UNSUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES (HYPOTHESIS' SET 4) 
Hypothesis df error t 
Hypothesis 4 ·'· a" 72 . 58 . 17 
Emotion 
Hypothesis 4b 18 .58 . 6 9 
Hypothesis 4 ·'· a" 72 . 9 0 . 56 
Responsibility 
p 
Hypothesis 4b 18 . 9 0 4.33 .01 
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... •: Denotes hypotheses predicting nonsignificant differences. 
The statistical summary of means and comparisons in 
Hypothesis Set 4 can be found in Tables VIII and IX. With 
the exception of emotion attributions of actors and obser-
vers in stranger dyads, Hypothesis Set 4 supported predic-
tions derived form self system considerations. It was 
found that unsuccessful actors in stranger dyads would 
attribute less responsibility to themselves for their out-
comes than would their observers, yet the actors did not 
feel worse about these outcomes than did their observers. 
On the other hand, unsuccessful actors and observers who are 
friends attributed equal responsibility to, and felt equally 
bad about, the actor's outcome. 
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Hypothesis Set 5 
Emotion Hypothesis 5, which predicted that actors would 
feel better about their opponent's unsuccessful outcome 
(M = 6.35) than about his successful outcome (M = 6.35), 
was not supported, ! (38) = .00. However, Responsibility 
Hypothesis 5, which predicted that actors would attribute 
more responsibility to the opponent for the opponent's 
failure (M = 6.95) than for his success (M = 4.95), was 
supported, t (38) = 3.13, E.< .OL 
TABLE X 
MEANS FOR ACTOR ATTRIBUTIONS FOR OPPONENTS' 
OUTCOMES (HYPOTHESIS SET 5) 
Dyad 
Attribution Outcome~': Friendship Stranger 
Successful 7.20 5.50 
Emotion 
Unsuccessful 6.10 6. 6 0 
Successful 8.10 5.80 
Responsibility 
Unsuccessful 5. 0 0 4.90 
.M 
6.35 
6. 3 5 
6.95 
4.95 
i: In the Outcome column is listed the "Successful" or 
"Unsuccessful" outcome of the actor making the attribu-
tion. The outcome he is rating, the opponent's, is 
opposite his own. 
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Emotion Hypothesis Sa, which predicted that actors in 
successful friendship dyads would feel better (M = 7.20) 
about the other player's unsuccessful outcome than would 
actors in stranger dyads (M = 5.50), was sUpported,! (18) = 
2.93, £< .01. Responsibility Hypothesis Sa, which predicted 
that actors in friendship dyads would attribute more per-
sonal responsibility to their opponents for the opponent's 
unsuccessful outcomes (M = 8.10) than would actors in 
stranger dyads (M = 5.80), was also supported,! (18) = 
2.S6, E_.(.Ol. 
TABLE XI 
COMPARISONS FOR ACTOR ATTRIBUTIONS FOR 
OPPONENTS' OUTCOMES (HYPOTHESIS SET S) 
Hypothesis df error 
Hypothesis s 38 .41 
Emotion Hypothesis Sa 18 . s 8 
Hypothesis Sb 18 . s 8 
Hypothesis 5 38 .64 
Responsibility Hypothesis Sa 18 . 9 0 
Hypothesis Sb 18 . 9 0 
t 
. 0 0 
2. 9 3 
. 8 6 
3.13 







Emotion Hypothesis 5b, which predicted that actors in 
unsuccessful friendship dyads would feel worse (~ = 6.10) 
about their opponent 1s successful outcomes than would un-
successful actors in stranger dyads (~ = 6.60), was not 
supported, t (18) = .86. Responsibility Hypothesis 5b, 
which predicted that actors in friendship dyads would attri-
bute less responsibility to their opponents for the oppo-
nent1s successful outcomes (M = 5.00) than would actors in 
stranger dyads (~ = 4.90), was not supported, ! (18) = .11. 
The statistical summary of means and comparisons for 
Hypothesis Set 5 can be found in Tables X and XI. General 
predictions derived from consideration of self system moti-
vation were only partially supported. Within Hypothesis 
Set 5 it was seen that actors, in general, feel that an 
opponent 1s unsuccessful outcome is more a result of the 
opponent 1 s personal responsibility than is the opponent 1 s 
successful outcome. Yet, actors do not, in general, feel 
worse about the opponent 1 s success than they feel about the 
opponent 1s failure. 
Actors in friendship dyads felt significantly better, 
and attributed more personal responsibility to the opponent, 
for an opponent 1 s loss than did successful actors in stran-
ger dyads. Support for the social facilitation implications 
for self systems and-these attributions was not complete, 
however, as no differences were found in attributions of 
responsibility about an opponent 1s success, or feelings 
about an opponent 1 s success, between the ratings of actors 
in friendship and stranger dyads. 
• 
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Hypothesis Set 6 
Emotion Hypothesis 6a, which predicted that friends ' 
would feel better about an unsuccessful outcome for an ac-
tor's opponent (M = 7.00) than would strangers (~ = 5.50), 
was supported, t (18) = 2.59, £ (.01. Responsibility Hypo-
thesis 6a, which predicted that observers who were friends 
of the actors they observed would attribute more personal 
responsibility to the actors' opponents (~ = 7.20) for the 
opponents' unsuccessful outcomes (actors' successful out-
comes) than strangers would (M = 6.90), was not supported, 
t (18) = .33. 
TABLE XII 
MEANS FOR OBSERVER ATTRIBUTIONS FOR OPPONENTS' 
OUTCOMES (HYPOTHESIS SET 6) 
Dyad 
Attribution Outcome1~ Friendship Stranger 
Successful 7.00 5.50 
Emotion 
Unsuccessful 5. 7 0 5.70 
Successful 7. 2 0 6. 9 0 
Responsibility 
Unsuccessful 4.50 7.90 
1~ In the Outcome column is listed the "Successful 11 or 
11 Unsuccessful outcome of tne·actor making the attri-
bution. The outcome he is rating, the opponent's, 
is opposite his own. 
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Emotion Hypothesis 6b, which predicted that friends 
would feel worse about the opponent's successful outcomes 
(M = 5.70) than would strangers (~ = 5.70), was not supported, 
t (18) = .00. However, Responsibility Hypothesis 6b, which 
predicted that friends would attribute less personal respon-
sibility to the actors' opponents (M = 4.50) for a success-
ful outcome than would strangers (M = 7.90), was supported, 
! (18) = 3.78, E_<.Ol. 
TABLE XIII 
COMPARISONS FOR OBSERVER ATTRIBUTIONS FOR 
OPPONENTS' OUTCOMES (HYPOTHESIS SET 6) 
Hypothesis df error t 
Hypothesis 6a 18 . 58 2. 59 
Emotion 
Hypothesis 6b 18 . 58 . 0 0 
Hypothesis 6a 18 . 9 0 . 3 3 
Responsibility 




The statistical summary of means and comparisons for 
Hypothesis Set 6 can be found in Tables XII and XIII. In 
an unusual pattern of results, self system predictions for 
observers were not fully supported. Within Hypothesis Set 
6, it was found that friends and strangers attribute equal 
responsibility to the actor's opponent for the opponent's 
unsuccessful outcome, but friends feel better about those 
outcomes than do strangers. On the other hand, friends 
attribute less responsibility to an opponent for the oppo~ 
nent's success than strangers attribute, but friends and 
strangers feel the same about those outcomes. 
Hypothesis Set 7 
93 
Emotion Hypothesis 7a, which predicted that no signifi-
cant difference in emotion would be expressed by actors 
(M = 6.10) and observers (M = 5.70) in friendship dyads 
about an opponentYs successful outcome, was supported 3 
t (72) = .69. Responsibility Hypothesis 7a 3 which predicted 
that actors (M = 5.00) and observers (M = 4.50) in friend-
ship dyads would not significantly differ ln personal respon~ 
sibility attributed to an opponent who had a successful 
outcome, was supported, t (72) = .56. 
Emotion Hypothesis 7b~ which predicted that actors in 
stranger dyads would feel worse about an opponent's success~ 
ful outcome (M = 6.60) than would observers in stranger 
dyads (M = 5.70), was not supported, t (18) = 1.55. Re-
sponsibility Hypothesis 7b, which predicted that actors in 
stranger dyads would attribute less personal responsibility 
to an opponent for the opponent's successful outcome (M = 
4.90) than would observers in stranger dyads (M = 7.90) 3 
was supported, t (18) = 3.33, £ < .01. 
TABLE XIV 
MEANS FOR ACTOR VERSUS OBSERVER ATTRIBUTIONS 
FOR OPPONENT'S SUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES 
(HYPOTHESIS SET 7) 
Viewpoint 
Attribution Dyad Actor Observer 
Friendship 6.10 5.70 
Emotion 
Stranger 6.60 5.70 
Friendship 5. 0 0 4.50 
Responsibility 
Stranger 4.90 7. 9 0 
The statistical summary of means and comparisons ln 
94 
Hypothesis Set .7 can be found in Tables XIV and XV. Within 
Hypothesis Set 7 predictions derived from self system con-
siderations were largely supported. It was found that ac-
tors and observers in friendship dyads do not differ in re-
sponsibility attributed to, or feelings about, a successful 
opponent. Actors in stranger dyads attributed sig~ilificantly 
less responsibility to, but did not feel significantly worse 
about, the outcome of a successful opponent than do obser-
vers in stranger dyads. 
TABLE XV 
COMPARISONS FOR ACTOR VERSUS OBSERVER ATTRIBUTIONS 
FOR OPPONENTS' SUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES 
(HYPOTHESIS SET 7) 
Hypothesis df error t 
Hypothesis 7 a 'I'; 72 .58 . 6 9 
Emotion 
Hypothesis 7b 18 . 58 1. 55 
Hypothesis 7a'l'; 72 . 9 0 . 56 
Responsibility 
Hypothesis 7b 18 . 9 0 3.33 
-;,'; Denotes hypotheses predicted to have nonsignificant 
differences. 




Emotion Hypothesis 8a, which predicted that no signifi-
cant difference in emotion would be felt between actors 
(M = 7.20) and observers (M = 7.00) in friendship dyads, 
was supported, t (72) = .34. Responsibility Hypothesis Sa, 
which predicted that no significant difference would occur 
in personal responsibility attributed to an opponent for the 
opponent's unsuccessful outcome between actors (~ = 8.10) 
and observers (~ = 7.20) in friendship dyads, was supported, 
t (72) = 1.00. 
TABLE XVI 
MEANS FOR ACTOR VERSUS OBSERVER ATTRIBUTIONS 
FOR OBI?:ONENT'S;': UNSUCCESSFUL' OUTCOMES 
(HYPOTHESIS SET 8) 
Viewpoint 
Attribution Dyad Actor Observer 
Friendship 7. 2 0 7. 0 0 
Emotion 
Stranger 5. 50 5. 50 
Friendship 8.10 7. 2 0 
Responsibility 





7. 6 5 
6.35 
Emotion Hypothesis 8b, which predicted that no signifi-
cant difference in emotion would be felt between actors 
(M = 5.50) and observers (M = 5.50) in stranger dyads, was 
supported, t (72) = .00. Also, Responsibility Hypothesis 
8b, which predicted that no significant difference would 
occur in personal responsibility attributed to an opponent 
for the opponent's unsuccessful outcome between actors 
(M = 5.80) and observers (M = 6.90) in stranger dyads, was 
supported, t (72) = 1.33. 
Finally Emotion Corollary 2, which predicted better 
feelings about an opponent's unsuccessful outcome in friend-
ship {M = 7.10) than in stranger (M = 5.50) dyads, was sup-
97 
ported, t ( 3 8) = 3. 9 0, E.< . 01. Responsibility Corollary 2, 
which predicted that more personal responsibility would be 
attributed to an opponent for his unsuccessful outcome in 
friendship (M = 7.65) than in stranger (~ ~ 6.35) dyads, was 
supported, t ( 3 8) = 2. 0 6, E. < . 0 5. 
TABLE XVII 
COMPARISONS FOR ACTOR VERSUS OBSERVER ATTRIBUTION 
FOR OPPONENTS' UNSUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES 
(HYPOTHESIS SET 8) 
Hypothesis df error t 
Hypothesis Sa 72 .58 . 3 4 
Emotion Hypothesis Bb 72 . 58 . 0 0 
Corollary 2 38 .41 3.90 
Hypothesis Sa 72 . 9 0 1. 00 
Responsibility Hypothesis Bb 72 . 9 0 1. 3 3 
Corollary 2 38 . 6 3 2.06 
p 
.01 
. 0 5 
The statistical summary of means and comparisons for 
Hypothesis Set 8 can be found in Tables XVI and XVII. With-
in Hypothesis Set 8 all· predictions derived from self system 
and social facilitation considerations were supported. It 
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was found that actors and observers within both friendship 
and stranger dyads do not significantly differ in responsi-
bility attributed to an opponent for the opponent's unsuc-
cessful outcome. However, members of friendship dyads attri-
bute more personal responsibility to the opponent for his 
unsuccessful outcome, and feel better about that outcome, 
than do members of stranger dyads. 
Reflections: 
The Results Versus the Hypotheses 
No single hypothesis within this collection was a cru-
cial test of the self system model. Rather, the strength of 
the model was reflected in its ability to deal with rela-
tions between several different aspects of acting or obser-
ving (e.g., observing--or acting--as a stranger versus obser-
ving--or acting--as a friend) across several hypotheses. To 
summarize these results into a coherent, overall picture of 
the model's successes and failures, the Hypothesis Sets were 
divided into three groups, and results within each group 
were explored separately. These groups were: (1) attribu-
tions of actors (Hypothesis Sets 1 and 5); (2) attributions 
of observers (Hypothesis Sets 2 and 6); and 3) comparisons 
of actors' and observers' attributions (Hypothesis Sets 3, 
4. 7, and 8). 
Attributions of Actors 
A descriptive survey of predictions concerning actor 
attributions reveals that, in all, four responsibility hypo-
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theses and two emotion hypotheses were supported; two re-
sponsibility hypotheses and four emotion hypotheses were not 
supported. Looking at these results from another perspec-
tive, twice an emotion hypothesis and its corresponding re-
sponsibility hypothesis was supported; twice neither an 
emotion hypothesis nor its corresponding responsibility 
hypothesis was supported; and twice either a responsibility 
hypothesis or an emotion hypothesis was supported, while 
the corresponding emotion hypothesis or responsibility hypo-
thesis was not supported (Table XVIII). 
TABLE XVIII 
FREQUENCY OF SUPPORT AND NONSUPPORT FOR PREDICTIONS 
WITHIN ACTOR HYPOTHESES (1 and S) 
Supported 
Set S Set 1 
Within Dyad Other Dyad Total 
Emotion Hypotheses 1 







S, Sa 4 
S, Sb 4 
Sb 2 
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General Hypotheses. Obviously, the support for predic-
tions within this group was far from complete. Most impor-
tant, however, was the fact that Responsibility Hypothesis 1 
and Emotion Hypothesis 1 were each supported. Successful 
actors felt better about their outcomes, and attributed more 
personal responsibility to themselves, than did unsuccessful 
actors. These results correspond to previous evidence (Beck-
man, 1970; Gilmor & Minton, 1974) suggesting that actors 
accept more personal responsibility for success than for 
failure. The·results also show that more positive emotions 
correspond to personal responsibility attributions of actors. 
Thus, there is support for the interpretation that good out-
comes which produce pleasant emotions and favorable reflec-
tions upon the self are associated with personal responsi-
bility attributions, while outcomes which produce unpleasant 
emot~ons and unf~vorable reflections upon the self are as-
sociated with impersonal responsibility attributions. 
Responsibility Hypothesis 5 found that actors attribu-
ted less responsibility to an opponent for the opponent's 
success than for his failure, but no difference in emotions 
expressed about an opponent's successful or unsuccessful 
outcome was found (Emotion Hypothesis 5). These results do 
not entirely support predictions, as it was proposed that 
actors would feel better when ±he opponent's outcome was 
unsuccessful than when it was successful. Yet, it seems 
that the fact that there were no differences in-emotions, 
while differences in responsibility attributions occurred, 
-------------
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reflects a problem inherent 1n utilizing expressed emotions 
about outcomes, rather than a problem in the self system 
model. Because of the need to maintain a favorable self 
image to others, it is possible that expressed emotions may 
not always correspond to actual emotions. This problem will 
be discussed in regard to Emotion Hypothesis 5, but the dis-
cussion is also significant to other subsequent emotion 
hypotheses which were not fully supported. 
Heider (1958) defined a feeling of contentment or hap-
piness about the bad £ortunes of another individual as 
"malicious joy." To openly express contentment about ano-
ther individual's bad outcome is not often considered social-
ly acceptable and, as termed by Heider (1958), is a "discor-
dant reaction." Impression management theory (Goffman, 1959) 
predicts that individuals wish to comvey the best impression 
of themselves to others, and Rosenberg's (1965) evaluation 
apprehension postulate indicates that impression management 
operates within a subject-experimenter situation. That is, 
subjects in experiments wish to have the experimenter see 
them in the most favorable light possible" Within the pre-
sent experiment, to express joy about another's failure 
might be interpreted by a. subject as causing the experimenter 
to look badly upon him. The experimenter might see him as a 
malicious person. Also, within the context of the self sys-
tem model, bad impressions and evaluations of others upon 
the self may be debilitating to the self system, and there-
fore outcomes to be avoided. Thus, to not express good 
------------- - ----- --------
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feelings about an opponent's misfortune, even though the 
feelings may be actually felt, is an impression managing 
attribution. Therefore, the failure of Emotion Hypothesis 
5 may have resulted from subjects' impression managing tac-
tics, and not from a failure of the self system model. 
Diller's (1954) results seem to confirm this analysis. 
Recall that Diller found that subjects who fa'iled in a task 
did not overtly report falls in their self esteems after the 
failure, but covert measures seemed to indicate that there 
was a self esteem depression. For overt reports of the 
self, it would be impression managing to not reveal that one 
had been hurt by an experimental outcome, even· though one's 
actual feelings about the outcome are bad. Assuming the 
validity of the current conception of the self system, re-
ports of emotions may be seen as overt reports of self 
system relevance of outcomes, while responsibility attribu-
tions might be seen as a more covert report of self system 
relevance. Thus, the more covert in the present experiment 
reflected true feelings, while the more overt measure re-
flected impression managing feelings. 
Social Facilitation Hypotheses. All predictions from 
the social facilitation modifications concerning attribu-
tions of successful actors were supported, while no predic-
tions concerning attributions of unsuccessful actors were 
supported. These results indicate that the social facili-
tation effect is real, but is masked in the unsuccessful 
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actor situation" Perhaps a "basement effect" occurred for 
unsuccessful actors, whereby they felt so bad about their 
outcomes (hence, a strong motivation to attribute impersonal 
responsibility) that it made little difference to them whe~ 
ther they were observed by friends or strangers" Indeed) 
Shaw and Sulzer (1964) have found that, all other factors 
controlled, observers assign more personal responsibility 
to an actor for bad outcomes than for good outcomes" More-
over, dispositional (trait) attributions follow from strong 
personal responsibility inferences (Jones & Davis, 1965). 
Therefore, others are likely to hold an actor highly re-
sponsible for his bad outcomes, and infer undesirable traits 
because of the outcomes. Assuming that actors are aware of 
these consequences (as they spend much of their lives ob~ 
serving, as well as acting, the assumption seems valid), 
whether the observer is a friend or a stranger would make 
little difference" In either case, actors would be motiva-
ted to dissociate bad outcomes from themselves. It would~ 
then, probably require an instrument more sensitive than 
the present self-report method to measure differences in 
responsibility attributions between unsuccessful actors who 
were observed by friends or by strangers. The difference 
is still theoretically important for the self system model~ 
as if it did not exist, the concept of self system relevance 
of friend observers to actors would be diminished" 
104 
Attributions of Observers 
A descriptive survey of predictions (Responsibility 
Corollaries and Emotion Corollaries will be grouped with 
Responsibility Hypotheses and Emotion Hypotheses in this 
section.) about observer attributions reveals that, in all 3 
three responsibility -hypotheses and three emotion hypothe-
ses were supported; one emotion hypothesis and one respon-
sibility hypothesis was not supported. From another per-
spective, twice both a responsibility hypothesis and its 
corresponding emotion hypothesis was supported; and twice 
either a responsibility hypothesis or emotion hypothesis 
was supported, while the corresponding emotion hypothesis 
or responsibility hypothesis was not supported (Table XIX)" 
Predictions about observers' emotion. and responsibility 
attributions were largely supported. Most importantly, all 
predictions concerning observers' attributions about the 
actors they observed (friend or stranger) were supported. 
This evidence strongly supp~rts the present contention that 
outcomes of friends are relevant to the self systems of 
observers. 
Attributions about the outcomes of opponents were not 
so clearly supportive of the self system model. Neither 
responsibility hypothesis-emotion hypothesis pair within 
Hypothesis Set 6 found differences in responsibility attri-
bution and expressed emotion to coincide. 
TABLE XIX ., ' 
FREQUENCY OF SUPPORT AND NONSUPPORT FOR PREDICTIONS 





Within Dyad Other dyad Total 
Emotion Hypothesis 2a, 2b 6a 3 
Responsibility Hypothesis 2a, 2b 6b 3 
Nonsupported 
Emotion Hypothesis 6b 1 
Responsibility Hypothesis 6a 1 
The fact that all predictions about observations of 
actors were supported, while predictions about observations 
of opponents were less clearly supported, suggests the rea-
sons for the anomalies in the observations of opponents. 
For an observer who is a friend of an actor he viewed, the 
outcome of the actor friend is more important than is the 
outcome of the opponent. After all, the friend is more 
socially important than is the opponent who is a stranger. 
However, the outcome of an opponent of the friend is more 
important to an observer's self system than is the outcome 
of an opponent of a stranger. This idea was dealt with 
earlier in the presentation of the self system model: 
The more a particular negative outcome is relevant 
to and threatens one's self system, or the more a 
positive outcome is.0elevant to and enhances one's 
self system, the gr'eater the effect of the self 
system on attributions (p~-21). 
Since attribution regarding an opponent's outcome 1s 
more removed from a friend observer's self system than is 
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attribution regarding the outcome of a friend, differences 
between friends and strangers in emotions and responsibility 
attributions about outcomes of opponents become less than 
differences in emotions and responsibility attributions 
about the outcomes of the friends or strangers being obser-
ved. 
For example, if I am an observer of a successful friend, 
I probably feel very good about his success and moderately 
good about the opponent's failure. A stranger observer 
might feel neutral about either outcome. The difference 
between my emotions and his emotions, then, is greater for 
the actors we observed (friend or stranger) than for the 
opponents. It, statistically, becomes more difficult to 
find significance between our emotions for the opponent than 
for the actors we observed. At the same time, differences 
between our responsibility attributions are harder to ob-
tain for ratings of opponents, also. 
As the differences between responsibility and emotion 
attributions for an opponent might be comparatively small, 
they become more open to influence from factors other than 
outcomes themselves. One such factor is statistical error. 
107 
Another factor (which concerns the self system) is the im-
pression management and evaluation apprehension mechanism. 
It is plausible, then, that impression managing considera·-
tions interacted with direct outcome considerations on the 
friend observers' self systems, thereby producing the pat-
tern of results found for observers' attributions for oppo-
nents outcomes. 
Attributions of friends and strangers for the outcomes 
of actors whom they observed provided more direct evidence 
regarding the self system model than did attributions of 
friends and strangers for opponents' outcomes. These attri-
butions were more directly related to friend observers' self 
systems, did not appear to b~ confused by extraneous factors, 
and supported the model completely. 
Actors Versus Observers 
Hypotheses comparing actor and observer attributions 
are not orthogonal to hypotheses considering attributions of 
actors and observers, respectively. Therefore, they might 
be influenced by the same factors which were found to influ-
ence hypotheses which looked at actors and observers, sepa-
rately. Yet, comparisons of actors and observers are a sec-
ond way to look at the data, and should also be predictable 
within the self system model. Indeed, a survey of predic-
tions comparing actor and observer responsibility attribu-
tions and expressed emotions reveals that all ten responsi-
bility hypotheses and responsibility corollaries were sup-
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ported; eight emotion hypotheses and emotion corollaries 
were supported, and two emotion hypotheses were not suppor-
ted (Table XX). Looking at responsibility-emotion hypothe-
sis pairs, both the emotion hypothesis and corresponding 
responsibility hypothesis (or emotion corollary and respon-
sibility corollary) were supported eight times, and the 
responsibility hypothesis was supported, while the corres-
ponding emotion hypothesis was not supported, twice. The 
strength of these results strongly indicates the importance 
of actor versus observer comparisons in the investigation 
of the self system model. 
Obviously, support for the self system model from the 
actor versus observer comparison perspective is considerable. 
A note of some caution about these results must be raised, 
however, as several of the predictions of no significant 
difference between groups were confirmed. Interpretation 
of causes of nonsignificant differences are generally termed 
"equivocal" or "indeterminant," although post hoc hypotheses 
may be applied to unexpected nonsignificant differences (as 
has been done with previous unsupported hypotheses in this 
discussion). It may also be argued that confirmation of "no 
difference" hypotheses provide equivocal and indeterminant 
information in this experiment. Yet, within this experiment 
these "no difference" predictions were in conjunction with 
"significant difference" predictions which were largely 
confirmed. Also, these predictions were tested liberally, 
so that assurance about "no difference" could be increased. 
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In a system where a network of nonsignificant difference 
predictions and significant difference predictions were each 
confirmed, it appears that the nonsignificant differences 
were, in fact, representative of nonsignificant differences, 
and not of significant differences which were lost to Type II 
errors. This conclusion seems especially appealing in light 
of the fact that all nonsignificant difference predictions 
were supported. 
TABLE XX 
FREQUENCY OF SUPPORT AND NONSUPPORT FOR PREDICTIONS WITHIN 






Sets 3 & 4 
Within Dyad 











Sets 7 & S 
Other Dyad Total 















Successful Actors and Their Observers. Actors and ob-
servers in both friendship and stranger dyads attributed 
essentially the same emotions and responsibility for the 
successful outcomes of the actors. Yet, subjects in friend-
ship dyads felt better about successful outcomes, and attri-
buted more personal responsibility for those outcomes, than 
did subjects in stranger dyads. These results support the 
self system and social facilitation argument that either 
observing or being observed by a friend during a successful 
outcome interaction creates a stronger connection between 
that outcome and the self system, thereby increasing positive 
emotions and subsequent personal responsibility attributions. 
The same pattern was found for attributions concerning 
opponentst outcomes. Actors and observers within friendship 
or stranger dyads did not differ in responsibility or emo~ 
tions attributed to the unsuccessful opponents, but subjects 
within friendship dyads felt better about an unsuccessful 
outcome, and attributed more personal responsibility to the 
opponent for it, than did those in stranger dyads. These 
results verify two self system predictions. First, observers 
who are friends share bonds with actors and feel as actors 
do about outcomes and responsibility. Second, the attribu-
tions of personal responsibility are greater and there are 
more intense emotions (motivation) in friendship· than in 
stranger dyads. 
Unusccessful Actors and Their Observers. Unsuccessful 
actors and friends who observed them did not significantly 
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differ in attributions of responsibility or in expressions 
of emotions. These results support the self system inter-
pretation, derived from Shaver's (1970) and Fromme's (Note 7) 
propositions. An actor's outcome is associated with a 
friend's self system, an association which causes the friend 
to feel emotionally the same as the actor and to attribute 
responsibility as he does. 
When there was an unsuccessful outcome in stranger . 
dyads, actors attributed less personal responsibility than. 
did the strangers who observed them, but did not express 
worse feelings than the observers. The attribution of less 
personal responsibility conformed to predictions derived 
from the self system model (and the information processing 
model as well), but the emotion attributions did not support 
Emotion Hypothesis 8b. Again, impression management based 
on evaluation apprehension is a likely explanation for· this 
failure. Expressing bad feelings about losses might be seen 
by subjects as showing weakness. Unsuccessful subjects 
might perceive that the experimenter would see them as strong 
individuals (e.g., good sports), in spite of their losses, 
if they did not express unhappy feelings about their out-
comes. Showing strength by denying bad feelings about an 
outcome in an experiment would then be a self system main-
taining attribution. 
Attributions of responsibility and emotions to success-
ful opponents by unsuccessful actors and their friends did 
not differ, thereby supporting self system predictions. 
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Attributions within str~nger dyads also substantially sup-
ported predictions. ~.Actors-within·stranger dya~s attributed 
less personal responsibility to opponents for opponents' 
successful outcomes, and felt marginally worse about those 
outcomes, than did observers in stranger dyads. Again, a 
likely reason for the marginality of the significance of 
the emotion attribution is an impression management--
evaluation apprehension explanation. For the actor to ex~ 
press bad feelings about an opponent's success would not 
be an impression managing outcome, as it shows resentment 
for that outcome on the part of the subject, and to display 
resentment is a negative characteristic. 
CHAPTER VIII 
DISCUSSION 
The Results and the Self System 
The results of this experiment, for the most part, di-
rectly supported predictions derived from the proposed self 
system motivation model. Twenty-nine of the forty hypothe-
ses were supported. The self system, as expressed by emo-
tions about outcomes, was shown to influence the responsi-
bility attributions of actors and of observers who were 
friends of actors. Positive emotions and personal respon-
sibility attributions were generally expressed for good 
outcomes; negative emotions and impersonal responsibility 
attributions were often expressed for bad outcomes. 
Predictive failures may have occurred because of a 
relationship between the self system of subjects and charac-
teristics of the experiment itself, predominantly from: 
(1) the fact that the experimenter was a knowledgeable 
observer himself (impression management--evaluation 
apprehension), possibly causing the subjects to not report 
good feelings about opponents' losses (be a good sport) or 
bad feelings about opponents' successes; and (2) the fact 
that attributions differences between groups in impact upon 
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the self were more difficult to find as outcomes become 
farther removed from the self. Overall, the results indi-
cate that the relationship of an outcome to an individual's 
self system is a strong determinant of the responsibility 
attributions he finally makes about the outcome. 
Within earlier chapters where the self system model was 
developed (Chapters I through IV), considerable attention 
was given to the information-processing approach to attribu-
tions. It was found that this approach, which deals only 
with the action and outcome information available to actors 
and observers and the ways in which the information is pro-
cessed, did not adequately account for responsibility attri-
butions and emotions of successful actors and "biased" ob-
servers. The self system interpretation was offered as an 
explanation which could account for these attributions. 
Several results of this experiment (e.g., an actor's accep-
tance of responsibility for good outcomes, and a friend ob-
server's attributions similar to the actor's for good and 
bad outcomes) cannot be explained by the information-
processing model, but are entirely consistent with the self 
system model. The self system approach is strongly supported 
by such results. 
Implications of the Model: 
Depression and Delinquency 
While laboratory evidence suggesting that responsl-
bility attributions following outcomes are a means of self 
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system protection or enhancement lS ln itself an exciting 
outcome, the value of laboratory research is enhanced when 
it can be applied to "real world" problems and phenomenao 
At this point, the self system model has been developed, and 
the results have been shown to give it considerable support. 
Therefore, this treatise concludes with a section describing 
the contributions this research may provide in regard to 
the clinical and behavioral problems of depression and 
delinquency. 
Depression 
Wylie's (1961) review of self concept evidence led to 
the conclusion that "protective attributions" serve to sta-
balize the self concept (in present terms, the self esteem 
portion of the self system). The term protective attribu-
tion corresponds to the present concept of an impersonal or 
environmental responsibility attribution. The present data 
support this idea as, in fact, protective attributions were 
made by subjects whose self systems seemed endangered by a 
bad outcome. But, do protective attributions actually pro-
tect the self system? If not always, under what conditions 
might they fail to do so, and with what consequences? These 
questions can be used to illustrate the full implications of 
the present self system model. 
An initial answer to the questions can be found in re-
search dealing with neurotics and depressiveso Several 
studies (e.g., Sarbin & Rosenberg, 1955; Friedman, 1955; 
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Leary, 1957) have demonstrated that neurotics are less "self 
accepting" and more self-critical than are normals. Bills 
(1954) has found that large discrepancies between the self 
image and self ideal (low self esteem) were related to sig-
nals of depression found on the Thematic Apperception Test. 
Also, Beck (1967a) noted that low self evaluation is char-
acteristic of depression: 
Self-devaluation is apparently part of the depressed 
patient's pattern of viewing himself as deficient in 
those attributes that are specifically important to 
him: ability, performance .•.. (p. 24). 
Eighty-one percent of a sample of severely depressed patients 
Beck studied reported this complaint. Apparently, a self 
system which has not been maintained in a favorable image 
appears to be associated with maladaptive behavior. 
Additionally, Scott and Senay (1970) found that failure 
ln several categories of activities (such as employment, 
health, family, and marriage) effectively separated depressed 
from normal individuals. Important failures or losses in 
an individual's life are antecedent to depression. Depressed 
patients were more likely than normals to have experienced 
unemployment, dismissal from a job, demotion, illness, a 
stillbirth, marital separation or divorce, death of a loved 
one, etc. 
Wylie (1961) also reviewed several studies testing the 
effects of success and £allure on self esteem, concluding 
that failures in important life situations lead to lowering 
of the self concept. Thus,·.the work of Beck (1967a), Scott 
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and Senay (1970), and Wylie's (1961) review together indi-
cate a sequence whereby failure leads to low self esteem 
and subsequent depression. 
The present self system model proposes that between the 
failure and the lowered self system and depression is a per-
sonal responsibility attribution. Evidence from the present 
experiment supports that proposition, as does a survey of 
studies of depressed patients. A classic example of a neu-
rotically depressed individual is one who incorrectly blames 
himself for the death of a close friend or relative. The 
I 
relationship between the self and the death is often tenuous 
(e.g., "My father died because ten years ago I told him to 
go to Hell.''). Beck (1967a & 1967b) has also noted that this 
self-blame for outcomes is a common characteristic in de-
pressed patients. Concerning the depressed patient, Beck 
(1967a) asserts that: 
The depressive patient's perseverating self-blame 
and self-criticism appear to be related to his 
egocentric notions of causality and his penchant 
for criticizing himself for his alleged deficien-
cies. He is particularly prone to ascribe adverse 
occurrances to some deficiency in himself, and 
then to rebuke himself for having this alleged 
defect (p. 24)'. 
Beck.(l967a) notes that 87% of the severely depressed 
patients he studied reported this symptom. Additionally, 
Valins and Nisbett (1972) have noted that several outpatients 
have problems which are based on misattributed personal re-
sponsibility (e.g., self-blame), and depression and anxiety 
are the result of the misattribution. Apparently, people 
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who are depressed often (at least in 87% of the cases re-
ported by Beck) attribute personal responsibility for bad 
outcomes. They do not show self protective responses, 
through which bad personal outcomes are attributed away from 
the self. 
This evidence leads to a theory on the development of 
reactive-type depression. Depression occurs when an indi-
vidual suffers an important (to the self system) failure or 
loss, or a series of important failures or losses, to which 
he attributes personal responsibility. This attribution 
gives rise to lowered self esteem. The individual becomes 
depressed when his self esteem falls. Beck (1967a) shares 
this belief that the affect (emotional) aspect of depression 
follows from the cognition of self-blame. Other symptoms 
of depression (e.g., crying, dejection, negative expectation 
indecisiveness, etc.) are secondary manifestations of the 
lowered self esteem. 
To answer the questions posed above, self protective 
attributions, when made, do seem to adequately shelter the 
self system. Yet, in circumstanties where individuals cannot, 
or do not, make self protective attributions for bad out-
comes (e.g., important personal losses) and accept personal 
responsibility for these outcomes, they can experience psy-
chological consequences, such as neuroticism and depres~ion. 
Therapy. Attribution therapy (Valins & Nisbett, 1972) 
is a means by which attributions of individuals can be 
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changed, and already has seen limited use in treatment. 
Attribution therapy, however, has been based on the 
information-processing approach, and the self system has not 
been considered a part of the process. The purpose of attri-
bution therapy has been to simply alter personal· attribu-
tions for events which an individual has been unhappy· or 
anxious about to less hurtful, impersonal responsibility 
attributions. The present self system model indicates that 
attribution therapy is successful because, or when, attribu-
tions damaging to the self are changed to attributions more 
protective or enhancive of the self. 
An example of attribution therapy carne from the Viet 
Narn war. New soldiers in corn:b'at units often found themselves 
alone and scorned by older soldiers in the units. The re-
sulting isolation often produced severe consequences, when 
the new soldiers became depressed, and felt that they were 
personally responsible for this treatment from others and 
were personally hated by them. It was shown, though, that 
this behavior on the part of veterans in the units was di-
rected to any new soldier ln a unit, as new soldiers were 
more likely than older veterans to behave in a manner which 
might get the unit into greater combat problems than the 
soldiers wished. This treatment by the veterans even had a 
name, the "F __ ing New Guy 11 treatment. 
Upon learning of the behavior, its roots, and conse-
quences, the Army instructed all soldiers entering into 
new combat units to be prepared for the "F __ ing New Guy" 
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treatment. Subsequently, depression in soldiers who entered 
new combat units was greatly reduced; they were able to 
attribute responsibility for their treatment away from 
themselves. 
It is apparent that the Army's warning to new recruits 
served to change their attributions for the behavior direc-
ted toward them from "They hate me. 11 to "They hate the 
F __ ing New Guy." A personal responsibility attribution, 
which was damaging to the recruits' self systems, was re-
placed by a less damaging impersonal responsibility attribu~ 
tion, and subsequent depression was avoided. More than just 
changing how the information (the treatment from others 1n 
the unit) was processed by recruits, the warnings changed 
the way the information affected the recruits' self systems, 
The Army example is encouraging in a regard other than 
the simple fact that it shows how personal responsibility 
attributions for bad or negative personal outcomes may be 
damaging to self systems. The fact that the Army could 
recognize the harm in this misattribution, and subsequently 
provide information to recruits to prevent its occurrance 
is quite exciting. Preventative therapy indicates a stronger 
continuity in life than does therapy after an individual has 
broken down. The use of self system information in this 
approach seems invaluable. 
Delinquency 
Not only might a personal responsibility attribution 
for bad outcomes lead to psychological problems, but beha-
12:1, 
vior, too, might be affected. For example, Fitts and Hamner 
(1969) looked at the relationship between the self system 
and delinquency. They found delinquency to be associated 
with low self concepts, and delinquents were less defensive 
of their self concepts than were nondelinquents. That is, 
delinquents were more likely than normals to allow material 
damaging to the self into the self system. A circular situ-
ation was proposed for delinquents, in which the delinquent 
first commits a "bad" action, then assigns personal respon-
sibility for the action, with a consequent lowering of self 
esteem. The new self system is then verified by more anti-
social acts, more personal responsibility, and an even lower 
self system. Thus: 
Delinquent behavior ... serves as inescapable, con-
crete evidence of 'what kind of person I am' .... 
An individual sees himself as 1 bad,' inadequate, 
different, etc, and acts accordingly (Fitts & Ham-
ner, 1969, p. 82). 
Supporting this conceptualization, Koeske (1975) has found 
that deviance by individuals is assigned a stronger self-
attribution (personal responsibility) than is nondeviance. 
As explained by the self system model, this sequence is 
set off by some important bad outcome or situation, or by a 
series of bad outcomes or situations, for which the delin-
quent may not have been personally responsible, yet for which 
he always assumed personal responsibility. Notice that self 
system views of depression and delinquency suggest that these 
abnormalities share a common base, a personal responsibility 
attribution for important, bad outcomes, and subsequent 
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lowered self esteem. Depressions occur as strong emotional 
responses to the fa~l in self esteem; delinquency (and pro-
bably in a broader sense, sociopathic behavior) occurs as a 
behavioral response to the fall in self esteem. 
Therapy. The way to prevent this downward chain of 
events leading to delinquency is to prevent the self ~ystem 
from being initially debilitated by preventing personal re-
sponsibility attributions for the initial bad outcome. The 
responsibility of the attribution therapist, after the se-
quence had begun, would be to locate the event which set off 
the sequence, and then redirect attributions for that inci-
dent. For example, if rich, social-climbing parents spend 
more time in social pursuits than with their child, the 
child might assume that he is personally responsible for the 
fact that his parents spend ~ittle tim~ with'him. As the 
self esteem of a child is only in its developing stage, 
his fragile self esteem might well be shattered by such an 
attribution, and he might then see himself as "bad," 
deserving little attention from his parents. Subsequent 
delinquency involving the child might be little more than 
a behavior: verification of this self 1mage. 
Therapy for the child should be aimed at showing him 
that he was not responsible for being ignored by his parents; 
the parents through their social pursuits were themselves 
responsible (an impersonal responsibility attribution:for 
the child). Attribution intervention for events subsequent 
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to this initial self system damaging attribution would be 
less successful, and possibly harmful; as the intervention 
would not deal with the underlying problem, and would not 
establish the original high self esteem. For example, if 
the boy were to steal a car, telling him that he was not re-
sponsible for the theft would not work; he did actually 
steal the car. Sympathetic responses to car stealing might 
signal to the boy apparent approval of the low self image 
and stealing act, thereby making the act's recurrance more 
likely in the future. 
Obviously, the therapist must center on the actual first 
important event for which the child was not responsible, but 
for which he erroneously and damagingly attributed personal 
responsibility. After this reattribution is established, 
guiding the child through a series of successful outcomes, 
whereby the self system is enhanced, should be the goal of 
long-term counseling and therapy. 
Last Words 
The previous clinical and behavioral examples of how 
the self system model applies to mental and behavioral pro-
blems is currently more:hypothesis than fact, more anecdotal 
than empirical. However, the model makes intuitive sense, 
and the present experiment supports it. Therapy for more 
minor, reactive personal problems (psychological or beha-
vioral) might be based on self system concepts, and its 
effectiveness could be recorded. This therapy might seem 
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similar to Carl Rogers' client-centered supportive therapy. 
However, it would be different form Rogers' nondirective 
approach in that self system therapy would focus on respon-
sibility attributions and direct itself toward obtaining 
high self esteem through the elimination of responsibility 
attributions which damage the self. In the area of deviant 
behavior, the study of the backgrounds of delinquents could 
be conducted, to see if such individuals have frequently 
misattributed personal responsibility for some important 
failure, or impersonal responsibility for success. This 
and other data will help determine the usefulness of the 
self system model. 
CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY 
Current theories consider the responsibility attribu-
tions individuals make for their own and others' outcomes 
to be a product of information-processing. Actors are said 
to be most attentive to information regarding environmental 
forces (e.g., luck, other individuals), and thereby assign 
environmental responsibility for their actions ~nd outcomes. 
The information most salient to observers is the behavior 
of actors, and consequently observers are said to assign 
personal responsibility to actors for any actionso However, 
this information-processing approach does not fit all re-
sponsibility attribution data. Actors often assign personal 
responsibility rather than environmental responsibility, 
especially for actions which produce good outcomes. Obser-
vers are sometimes defensive, and attribute environmental 
rather than personal responsibility for actions which pro-
duce bad outcomes. 
When consideration lS given to self systems of individ-
uals, attributions which do not fit the information-
processing model can be understood. According to the self 
system model, personal responsibility is assigned for ac-
tions whose outcomes are relevant to the self and provide 
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the opportunity for self-enhancement (e.g., successful out-
comes); environmental responsibility is assigned for actions 
whose outcomes are relevant to the self but which might lead 
to self-deprecation (e.g., failure outcomes). Therefore, 
actors assign personal responsibility for self-enhancing 
outcomes, and environmental responsibility for self-
deprecating outcomes. Observers who are strangers to actors, 
or who are associated with actors (e.g., friendship) who 
have self-enhancing outcomes, assign personal responsibility 
for outcomes. Observers who are associated with actors who 
have self-deprecating outcomes assign environmental respon-
sibility for outcomes. 
To test the self system predicti6ns, two actors compe-
ted for twenty trials in a message~modified, non-zero sum 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Each actor was observed by either 
a friend or a stranger. At the conclusion of the game, game 
points were summed, and one actor was named the winner, while 
the other was named the loser. Using 9-point rating scales, 
all actors and observers attributed responsibility (personal 
versus environmental) and expressed emotion (good versus bad) 
for each actor's outcome. Following William James' theory 
of self, emotion attributions were expected to reflect rele-
vance of outcomes upon an attributor's self system. 
Several hypotheses were tested for the responsibility 
and emotion attributions~ The results indicate that self 
systems influence the responsibility attributions of both 
actors and observers. Given an action and its outcome, an 
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emotional reaction occurs; this establishes the relevance of 
the outcome to the self system of the actor or observer, and 
responsibility for the action is assigned in a manner which 
will either enhance or protect the self system. 
Hypotheses which compared actor attributions to those 
of observers were strongly supported. Although hypotheses 
dealing solely with actors or observers were largely sup-
ported, an impression management-evaluation apprehension 
mechanism, by which subjects seemed to be presenting their 
best self-images to the experimenter, seemed to operate 
against some hypotheses. However, an impression management 
interpretation of the failures is consistent with self sys~ 
tern concepts. 
The results have implications for such clinical and 
behavioral problems as depression and delinquency. Depres-
sion frequently results from self-blame for failure and loss. 
Apparently, this self-blame results from an absence of the 
self-protective tendency to attribute impersonal responsi-
bility for self-deprecating outcomes. Appropriate therapy 
would be to restore (or establish) more self-protective and 
enhancive responsibility attributions. A similar interpre-
tation applies to delinquents, who might initially incor-
rectly assume personal responsibility for self-deprecating 
outcomes. The lowered self system resulting from this attri-
bution is then validated, and lowered further, by subsequent 
delinquent actions. Appropriate counseling would involve a 
reattribution for the initial misattribution, then proceed 
to a program designed to enhance the self system. 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME 
Your job in this competitive skill-strategy game lS to 
have a higher point total than the other player after 20 
joint-choice trials. Your points are determined by your in-
teraction with the other player. The competition centers 
around the Choice 1 or Choice 2 selections made by each of 
you on the choice trials. You make a selection or choice 
each time the green "go" light comes on by pushing the Choice 
1 or Choice 2 pushbuttons in the bottom center of your panel. 
After both of you have made a choice, a light will come on 
in one of the four green-and-red cells of the decision ma-
trix at the top of the panel. The light which comes on de-
pends on the choices each of you makes. Notice that you will 
either gain or lose points on each trial. For both players, 
the number of points you gain or lose is shown in green in 
the lighted ce~l of the choice matrix, and what the other 
player gains or loses for each trial is shown in the red, I 
will be keeping score throughout the game. After each trial 
I will tell how many points each person gained or lost on 
that trial. Then I will announce the total score up through 
that trial. After twenty trials I will give the final score, 
and announce the winner and the loser. 
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In addition to making your Choice 1 or Choice 2 selec-
tions on each trial, immediately preceeding the trial you 
will have an opportunity to send a message to the other 
player and to receive a message from him. On half of the 
trials you will send a message to the other player, then re-
ceive one from him. On the other trials you will receive a 
message from the other player, then send one to him. You 
will know whether you are to sehd or receive a message by 
the appropriate light which will light on your panel. If 
you are to recelve a message from the other player, the 
"Option to Receive a Message" light on the left side of the 
panel will come on. You will then wait to see which message 
light in the middle of your panel comes on. The message 
beside it is the one sent by the other player. 
If you are to send a message, the "Option to Send a 
Message'' light on the right side of the panel will come on. 
You will have to chose which message you want to send, then 
you will press the button beside that message. 
After you have both sent and received messages, the 
green go light will come on, and each of the players will 
then make their Choice 1 or Choice 2 selections, 
There is one important thing to remember about these 
messages. After you send or receive a message, you are 
still free to make either Choice 1 or Choice 2. You do not 
have to make the choice you said that you will make, or the 
choice the other player suggested you make. This is where 
the skill strategy comes into the game. The player who 
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develops the best strategy, the one who makes the best use 
of his messages and choices, will in all likelihood be the 
Wlnner. As the game proceeds, you should develop an idea of 
the best choices and messages to make on each trial, and 
whether or not to go along with the messages. This, then, 
becomes your strategy. 
Let me emphasize that the game is not rigged. The 
points you get on each trial depends entirely upon the choi-
ces and messages you make and send, in relation to the choi-
ces and messag~s the other player makes and sends. 
Remember, your goal for the 20 joint-choice trials lS 
to have a higher point total by either gaining more points 
or losing fewer points than the other player. 
After the game, please remain seated. I will hand out 
some booklets for each of you containing questions I would 
like you to answer about the game. This is why it is impor-
tant that both players and the observers pay close attention 
to the game. 
Before we begin the actual game, we 1 ll take a few prac-
tice trials, so you can get acquainted with.the messages and 
choices. 
APPENDIX B 
ANALYS.IS OF VARIANCE FOR THE 
RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS 
Source df MS F 
Outcome (A) 1 44.10 3.63 
Dyad (B) 1 .10 .01 
A X B 1 87.02 7.18 
Viewpoint (C) 1 12.10 1. 00 
A X c 1 34.22 2. 8 2 
B X c 1 65.02 5.36 
A X B X c 1 19.60 1. 62 
ss 72 12.12 wg 
Ratee (D) 1 .40 .10 
A X D 1 5. 6 2 1. 41 
B X c 1 2.02 .51 
c X D 1 . 6 2 .16 
A X B .X D 1 .oo . 0 0 
A X c X D 1 4.90 1. 23 
B X c X D 1 .40 .10 
A X B X c X D 1 4.22 1. 06 
DxSS 72 3. 9 8 wg 
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p 
• 0 6 
.01 
• 0 9 
. 0 2 
AP•PENDIX C 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE 
EMOTION ATTRIBUTIONS 
Source df MS F p 
Outcome (A) 1 182.76 48.62 .01 
Dyad (B) 1 6.01 1. 6 0 
A X B 1 31.51 8.38 .01 
Viewpoint (C) 1 2. 2 6 . 6 0 
A X c 1 . 01 . 0 0 
B X c 1 .01 • 0 0 
A X B X c 1 .01 . 0 0 
ss 72 3.76 wg 
Ratee (D) 1 23.26 7,75 .01 
A X D 1 138.75 46.24 .01 
B X D 1 3.31 1.10 
c X D 1 .76 . 2 5 
A X B X D 1 .06 . 0 2 
A X c X D 1 2.76 . 9 2 
B X c X D 1 • 0 6 .05 
A X B X c X D 1 1. 41 .47 
DxSS 72 3.00 wg 
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APPENDIX D 
CELL MEANS FOR THE AxBxCxD INTERACTION 
OF THE RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTION 
Ratee 















N = 10 per cell. 













CELL MEANS FOR THE AxBxCxD INTERACTION 
OF THE EMOTION ATTRIBUTION 
Ratee 
Outcome Dyad Viewpoint In group Other group 
Actor 9. 50 . 7.20 
Friend 
Observer 9. 30 7.00 
Successful 
Actor 8.70 5.50 
Stranger 
Observer 8.20 5.50 
Actor 4.60 6.10 
Friend 
Observer 4.50 5. 7 0 
Unsuccessful 
Actor 5.10 6.60 
Stranger 
Observer 5.50 5.70 
N = 10 per cell. 
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